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Germany’s	policy	of	expansionary	fiscal	consolidation	by	means	of	binding	fiscal	
rules	is	setting	a	positive	example	for	other	eurozone	countries,	but	that	alone	won’t	
suffice.	All	the	eurozone	governments	need	to	demonstrate	convincingly	their	own	
commitment	to	fiscal	consolidation	so	as	to	restore	the	confidence	of	markets,	not	
to	speak	of	their	own	citizens....	Germany’s	course	of	growth-friendly	deficit	
reduction	in	conjunction	with	its	suggestions	for	a	strengthening	of	Europe’s	fiscal	
framework	could	serve	as	a	blueprint	for	European	economic	governance.	
Wolfgang	Schäuble	(2010).1	
	
	
Overview		
What	follows	is	a	reply	to	the	critical	responses	of	Malte	Dold	and	Tim	Krieger,	Josef	Hien,	
Charlotte	Heath-Kelly,	Emmanuel	Pierre	Guittet,	Filipe	dos	Reis	and	Ben	Kamis	to	my	2016	
New	Perspectives	intervention	‘When	One	Religious	Extremism	Unmasks	Another:	
Reflections	on	Europe’s	States	of	Emergency	as	a	Legacy	of	Ordo-liberal	De-
hermeneuticisation’	(hereafter	ODH	–	for	“Ordoliberal	Dehermeneutisation”2).	My	reply	will	
be	divided	into	two	main	parts.	The	first	part	will	focus	on	what	I	will	call	‘a	disciplinary	
instruction	not	to	think.’	The	second	will	focus	on	what	I	will	call	‘constructive	invitations	to	
think	further.’	The	first	part	focuses	on	Dold	and	Krieger’s	arguments.	The	second	focuses	
predominantly	on	those	of	the	rest	of	the	interlocutors	listed	above.	What	ultimately	
emerges	out	of	this	second	section	is	a	reflection	on	the	need	to	consider	both	order	and	
disorder	as	constitutive	elements	of	human	freedom,	and	to	sustain	the	tension	between	
them.	Of	concern,	here,	I	argue,	is	a	freedom	that	refuses	to	be	subjected	conclusively	to	
any	“order	of	liberty”	that	a	liberal	government	in	general	and	an	ordoliberal	government	in	
particular	may	wish	to	establish.	
	
																																																						
1	See	Lechevalier	(2015:	77,	footnote	15).	
2	I	will	resort	to	the	more	elegant	term	“dehermeneutisation”	(instead	of	de-hermeneuticisation)	from	now	on.	
I	am	indebted	to	Chris	Engert	for	suggesting	this	improvement.	
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It	will	very	soon	become	clear	to	the	reader	that	I	consider	Dold	and	Krieger’s	
response	to	my	ODH	intervention	an	example	of	particularly	poor	scholarship,	so	I	may	as	
well	say	it	here.	I	have	spent	much	time	in	what	follows	responding	carefully	to	a	good	
number	of	their	contentions.	Many	of	these	contentions	may	well	be	considered	not	to	
merit	all	the	attention	I	have	given	to	them.	I	have	nevertheless	engaged	with	them	
meticulously	for	two	reasons	that	I	consider	important.	Firstly,	I	wish	to	state	clearly	that	I	
generally	consider	the	work	of	ordoliberal	scholars	interesting	and	important.	Were	I	to	just	
brush	off	Dold	and	Krieger’s	response	without	further	ado	as	a	sad	case	of	scholarly	
irresponsibility,	I	would	surely	close	down	the	possibility	of	more	constructive	academic	
exchanges	with	them	and/or	other	ordoliberals	in	the	future.	In	other	words,	by	responding	
carefully	and	meticulously	to	Dold	and	Krieger,	I	hope	to	have	kept	alive	the	possibility	of	
future	academic	exchanges	with	ordoliberals	who	may	be	more	willing	to	engage	in	a	
proper	scholarly	debate.	
The	second	reason	for	engaging	extensively	with	Dold	and	Krieger’s	response	
concerns	the	way	in	which	their	response	not	only	dismisses	my	ODH	intervention	as	devoid	
of	valuable	scholarly	insight,	but	also	misrepresents	its	central	thesis	as	a	vastly	
oversimplified	causal	argument.	The	meticulous	response	to	this	dismissal	and	
misrepresentation	that	follows	seeks	to	offer	the	readers	of	Dold	and	Krieger’s	response	an	
efficient	opportunity	to	assess	both	carefully	and	quickly	whether	the	lack	of	scholarly	
insight	and	oversimplified	causal	reasoning	that	Dold	and	Krieger	(D&K,	from	now	on)	
impute	to	ODH,	is	a	product	of	their	imagination,	or	a	fair	evaluation	of	my	text.	If	I	did	not	
provide	their	readers	this	opportunity,	D&K	might	well	succeed	in	having	an	easy	last	word,	
and	a	pernicious	one	at	that.	In	the	accelerated	world	in	which	we	live	today,	few	readers	of	
D&K’s	response	are	likely	to	take	the	time	to	go	back	to	my	text	to	determine	carefully	
whether	their	contentions	are	sound	and	fair.	
I	have	good	reason	to	say	this.	D&K	have	obtained	advice	and	comments	from	
respected	scholars	such	as	Brigitte	Young	and	Volker	Berghahn	before	sending	their	
response	off	for	publication.	I	find	it	surprising	that	these	scholars	did	not	advise	D&K	to	
reconsider	a	number	of	conspicuous	weaknesses	that	should	have	become	evident	from	a	
reading	of	D&K’s	text	alone.	But	these	scholars	would	have	had	many	more	reasons	for	
advising	D&K	to	reconsider	almost	all	of	their	contentions	had	they	gone	to	the	trouble	of	
comparing	D&K’s	text	carefully	with	mine.	Now,	if	even	friendly	mentors	or	colleagues	did	
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not	have	the	time,	energy	or	scholarly	inclination	to	compare	D&K’s	response	carefully	with	
my	ODH	intervention,	how	many	other	readers	can	one	expect	to	go	to	this	trouble?	This	is	
why	I	consider	it	necessary	to	respond	almost	line	for	line	to	D&K’s	response	in	what	
follows.	I	cite	them	extensively	in	each	case	so	that	the	reader	can	see	quickly,	clearly	and	
accurately	what	is	at	stake.	
It	is	with	regret	that	I	end	up	dedicating	much	less	time	and	space	in	what	follows	to	
the	responses	of	Hien,	Heath-Kelly,	Guittet,	Dos	Reis	and	Kamis	than	these	responses	
deserve.	I	have	gained	much	insight	from	these	responses	and	wish	to	thank	the	authors	for	
the	time	they	took	to	respond	intelligently	and	constructively	to	my	ODH	intervention.	I	
trust	they	will	consider	my	limited	responses	to	them	as	plausible	beginnings	of	further	
debates	which	we	may	have	in	the	future.	Space	constraints	prevented	me	from	taking	
things	further	than	I	have	done	here,	but	I	trust	there	will	soon	be	opportunities	to	revisit	
the	compelling	issues	they	raise.	
	
	
A	Disciplinary	Instruction	Not	to	Think	[Subtitle	Level	1]	
	
D&K	commence	their	response	to	my	ODH	intervention	with	a	brief	perfunctory	remark	
about	my	“excellent”	scholarship	in	the	field	of	legal	theory,	but	do	so	only	to	continue	with	
the	suggestion	that	I	should	better	constrain	my	scholarly	inquiries	to	the	field	of	legal	
theory,	because,	as	they	say,	“juxtaposing	one’s	own	expertise	upon	disjointed	fragments	of	
less	well	understood	research	from	other	fields	does	not	necessarily	lend	itself	to	convincing	
scholarship.”	They	continue	with	this	suggestion	as	follows:	
	
VDW’s	argument	in	[ODH]	rests	crucially	upon	assumptions	about	the	current	
economic	crisis,	ordoliberalism	and	the	genesis	of	terrorism;	however,	the	author	
fails	to	demonstrate	valuable	academic	expertise	in	these	topics.	We	strongly	doubt	
that	the	simple	mechanics	of	VDW’s	argument	support	the	assertion	that	–	with	or	
without	a	process	of	de-hermeneuticisation	–	Protestant	ethics	led	to	
ordoliberalism,	which	resulted	in	an	imposed	austerity	in	France	and	ultimately	
jihadist	terrorism.	This	causal	chain	is	not	only	highly	questionable,	but	also	its	
underlying	assumptions	are,	in	fact,	inaccurate.	
	
Having	shot	off	this	opening	salvo	about	my	failure	to	demonstrate	valuable	
academic	expertise	regarding	the	“economic	crisis,	ordoliberalism	and	the	genesis	of	
terrorism,”	they	proceed	to	instruct	me	on	the	proper	conceptual	distinction	between	
	 4	
“economic	scarcity”	and	“redistribution.”	I	will	presently	look	more	closely	at	their	
contentions	regarding	this	distinction.	Before	doing	so,	however,	I	also	wish	to	draw	
attention	to	another	remark	regarding	my	expertise	that	they	make	a	little	later	in	their	
reaction	to	my	NP	intervention.	D&K	write:	
	
Unfortunately,	most	writings	by	ordoliberal	scholars	were	never	translated	from	German	into	
English.	If	VDW	had	read	these	original	texts	or	at	least	the	contributions	of	scholars	with	a	
deep	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism	(such	as	Viktor	Vanberg),	he	would	probably	
have	started	questioning	his	own	assumptions	about	the	ordoliberal	program.	
	
Now,	one	cannot	help	wondering	a	bit	about	the	intellectual	climate	that	encourages	
a	statement	like	this	to	spill	so	innocently	into	an	academic	argument.	Let	me	nevertheless	
say	no	more	than	the	very	least	that	requires	being	said	in	response	here.	D&K	suggest	that	
I	would	not	have	made	my	incorrect	assumptions	about	ordoliberalism	had	I	been	able	to	
read	the	original	German	texts	of	this	German	tradition	of	economic	thinking,	or	the	works	
of	German	scholars	with	a	deep	understanding	of	the	tradition.	The	problem	cannot	lie	
here,	however,	for	my	German	is	not	so	shabby	as	they	seem	to	assume.	I	will	surely	not	call	
myself	an	expert	on	or	connoisseur	of	ordoliberal	thinking,	but	I	have	read	a	reasonable	
selection	of	primary	ordoliberal	texts	without	having	to	rely	on	translations	and	have	
supplemented	these	readings	with	a	good	number	of	secondary	texts,	several	of	them	also	
in	German	and	written	by	German	scholars	whom	it	would	be	difficult	to	accuse	so	brazenly	
of	not	having	a	“deep	[enough]	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism.”	
So,	considering	that	I	have	done	quite	a	bit	of	solid	homework,	my	failure	to	arrive	at	
a	“deep	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism”	is	likely	to	be	attributable	to	some	other	
failure	or	failures	on	my	part.	The	first	may	well	concern	an	inability	to	comprehend	the	
reduction	of	social	politics	to	the	ordering	of	an	economic	system	of	free	competition	that	
many	scholars	attribute	to	the	ordoliberal	school	of	economic	thinking.	I	shall	presently	
return	to	address	this	point	more	squarely.	A	second	failure	may	be	attributable	to	nothing	
less	than	a		psychological	resistance	to	“a	deep	understanding”	of	any	concern	with	order	–	
economic	order	included	–	that	refuses	to	sustain	a	due	regard	for	the	limits	of	order	and	
the	constitutive	role	that	disorder	plays	in	the	sustenance	of	a	stable	order.	I	come	back	to	
this	second	‘failure’	towards	the	end	of	all	the	responses	to	my	interlocutors	that	follow.	
Suffice	it	therefore	to	just	observe	for	now	that	my	failure	to	arrive	at	a	“deep	[enough]	
understanding”	of	German	ordoliberalism	may	well	relate	to	my	distrust	of	all	theoretical	
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endeavours	that	reduce	social-theoretical	inquiry	to	instrumental	concerns	with	the	
sustenance	of	order.		Such	endeavours,	I	suspect	(and	cannot	help	suspecting),	take	a	first	
step	towards	a	technocratic	reduction	of	government	to	the	pursuit	of	preselected	social	
goals	that	tolerates	no	further	questioning	of,	and	resistance	to,	this	preselection.	I	believe	
the	betrayal	of	liberal	democracy	and	the	road	to	authoritarianism	invariably	start	here.	
The	other	reason	for	my	failure	to	understand	German	ordoliberalism	deeply	
enough,	may	of	course	relate	to	the	inadequate	understanding	of	economic	theory,	as	such,	
that	D&K	attribute	to	me	in	the	first	passage	quoted	above.	I	must	of	course	concede	here	
that	I	have	no	formal	training	in	economics	and	that	this	may	well	be	a	significant	hindrance	
to	arriving	at	a	“deep	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism,”	or	an	adequately	advanced	
understanding	that	might	be	worthy	of	entering	into	a	discussion	with	the	hallowed	circles	
of	Freiburg	economic	thinking.	I	would	nevertheless	like	to	at	least	explain	in	what	follows	
why	I	am	left	somewhat	puzzled	by	several	aspects	of	D&K’s	response	to	my	arguments,	and	
especially	by	the	Economics	101	class	to	which	they	have	treated	me.	
Allow	me	to	begin	with	the	economics	class.	I	fail	to	grasp	what	exactly	D&K	sought	
to	teach	me	with	their	distinction	between	economic	scarcity	and	economic	redistribution	
and,	more	importantly,	why	they	are	not	themselves	somewhat	worried	by	the	way	they	
draw	this	distinction.	Their	invocation	of	the	distinction,	firstly,	does	not	seem	to	make	any	
point	apart	from	telling	me	that	I	am	out	of	my	depth	in	the	field	of	scientific	economic	
inquiry.	Secondly,	it	reveals	an	understanding	of	the	science	of	economics	that	is	remarkably	
out	of	touch	with	contemporary	thinking	about	the	status	of	social	science.	Thirdly,	it	would	
appear	to	hinge	on	a	conception	of	scientific	inquiry	that	renders	it	blind	to	its	own	
disciplinary	presuppositions	and	for	this	reason	dooms	it	to	a	self-imposed	thoughtlessness.	
And	fourthly,	it	does	all	of	the	above	only	to	end	up	endorsing	and	strengthening	the	
argument	regarding	economic	scarcity	and	economic	redistribution	that	I	put	forward	in	
ODH.	Under	the	first	three	sub-headings	that	follow,	I	unpack	the	second	and	third	point	
separately	and	the	first	and	fourth	together.	Thereafter	I	turn	to	a	number	of	the	other	
puzzling	contentions	that	D&K	make	in	response	to	ODH.	
	
The	Science	of	Economics	and	the	Linguistic	Turn	[Subtitle	Level	2]	
So	here	are	D&K	instructing	the	legal	theorist	with	a	disciplined	and	disciplinary	definition	of	
economic	scarcity:	
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In	economic	theory,	the	scarcity	problem	results	from	the	fact	that	while	resources	
are	limited	in	amount,	people	nevertheless	desire	them	in	an	infinite	amount.	
	
Their	definition	derives	from	Lionel	Robbins’	(1932)	definition	of	economics	as	“the	
science	which	studies	human	behaviour	as	a	relationship	between	ends	and	scarce	means	
which	have	alternative	uses.”3	D&K	attribute	the	endorsement	of	this	definition	to	“most	
economists.”	They	also	attribute	to	this	majority	of	economists	the	belief	that	“scarcity,	in	
the	first	place,	is	not	a	mental	or	normative	construct.”	And	with	this	invocation	of	the	
dominant	definition	of	economic	scarcity	in	economic	theory,	they	move	on	to	dismissing	
my	argument	regarding	economic	scarcity	as	a	social	and	mental	construction	that	is	subject	
to,	and	conditioned	by,	interpretation	and	reinterpretation.	In	other	words,	my	whole	ODH	
argument	falls	flat,	they	seem	to	say,	because	its	key	point	that	“economic	scarcity”	is	
conditioned	by	interpretation	and	hermeneutics	is	simply	spurious.	This,	of	course,	relieves	
me	of	the	burden	of	adding	anything	to	the	dehermeneuticisation	argument	that	I	put	
forward	in	ODH,	for	they	concede	and	confirm	the	point	in	the	clearest	of	terms.	They	only	
take	issue,	it	seems,	with	the	fact	that	I	deem	it	important	to	put	forward	an	argument	that	
they	consider	a	self-evident	point	of	departure	of	all	their	theoretical	endeavours.	Relieving	
me	of	the	burdens	of	my	arguments	by	taking	them	on	their	own	shoulders	–	shooting	
themselves	in	the	foot,	in	short	–	ultimately	becomes	a	main	feature	of	their	endeavours,	as	
we	shall	see	below.			
Let	me	nevertheless	retrace	the	dehermeneuticisation	to	which	D&K	admit	so	
blithely.	According	to	them,	“most	economists”	consider	economic	scarcity	a	transcendent	
reality	that	receives	an	immaculate	birth	into	human	language.	Its	transcendence	shatters	
all	traces	of	linguistic	immanence	(‘linguistic	immanence’	referring	to	the	linguistic	
recognition	that	no	language	escapes	itself,	no	language	escapes	its	own	linguistic	status,	
and	no	component	of	language	makes	sense	outside	conventional	relations	with	other	
language	components).	In	accordance	with	this	dismissal	of	the	notion	of	linguistic	
immanence,	the	science	of	economics	considers	itself	left	with	no	choice	as	to	how	this	
‘reality’	of	economic	scarcity	that	enters	it	from	beyond	is	to	be	accommodated	and	
communicated	further.	
																																																						
3	I	have	taken	this	reference	directly	from	Dold	and	Krieger	and	have	not	yet	consulted	the	source.	
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This	faith	in	transcendence	is	truly	remarkable	in	a	time	such	us	ours	that	is	so	
pervasively	burdened	by	the	recognition	of	the	conventional	constraints	that	language	
imposes	on	cultural	and	social	understanding.	It	is	especially	remarkable	given	that	many	
and	perhaps	even	“most”	social	scientists	who	reflect	meta-theoretically	on	their	own	
disciplinary	inquiries	would	probably	find	it	difficult	today	to	argue	their	way	around	the	
irreducible	linguisticity	of	their	scientific	endeavours.4	The	social	scientific	‘realists’	or	
‘positivists’	of	old	have	surely	not	disappeared	from	the	face	of	the	earth,	but	they	no	
longer	command	the	scene	and	most	likely	no	longer	constitute	a	‘majority’	of	any	kind.	
This,	of	course,	does	not	make	the	realists	wrong	and	the	linguistic	brigade	right.	But	it	does	
mean	that	social	science	is	exposed	to	a	meta-theoretical	or	meta-disciplinary	
indeterminacy	that	it	cannot	wish	away.	And,	with	this	indeterminacy	comes	the	call	for	
social	science	to	constantly	think	reflectively	about	its	constitutive	boundaries	and,	
therefore,	to	think.	The	linguistic	turn	in	the	social	sciences	surely	cannot	claim	the	victory	
of	having	launched	scientific	inquiry	on	a	better	way	to	truth	without	making	a	mockery	of	
its	own	insights.	But	it	can	claim	the	merit	of	having	woken	up	scientific	inquiry	to	the	
imperative	of	constantly	reconsidering	and	rethinking	its	foundational	concepts	and	
principles.	It	is	with	this	background	in	mind	that	I	wish	to	engage	with	D&K’s	invocation	of	
“most	economists”	as	regards	this	faith	in	transcendent	“economic	scarcity.”	
	
Thoughtless	Economic	Science	[Subtitle	Level	2]	
D&K’s	use	of	the	word	“most”	would	seem	to	allow	for	the	possibility	that	there	are	some	
economists	who	do	not	share	this	faith,	but	they	are	evidently	not	bothered	by	these	
others.	To	put	this	in	terms	that	Thomas	Kuhn	made	salient:	there	may	be	some	economists	
who	are	engaging	in	abnormal	scientific	inquiries	and	for	whom	economic	thinking	begins	
with	a	regard	for	the	way	in	which	the	notion	of	‘infinite	desire’	does	not	constitute	a	self-
evident	point	of	departure	for	economic	thinking,	but	D&K	are	not	interested	in	them	
(Kuhn,	1970).	These	other	economists	may	well	have	a	historical	regard	for	the	way	the	
notion	of	“infinite	desire”	is	conditioned	by	a	constellation	of	modern	conceptions	of	human	
																																																						
4	The	main	developments	in	meta-theoretical	reflection	on	social	science	and	the	humanities	that	make	
denials	of	the	linguisticity	of	social	theory	difficult	today	are	related	to	the	impact	of	hermeneutics	(Gadamer,	
Ricoeur),	pragmatist	and	post-analytical	theory	of	language	(Rorty,	Davidson)	and	post-structuralists	(Derrida,	
Foucault,	Lyotard)	on	late	twentieth	century	social	theory.	This	linguistic	turn	appears	to	have	entered	
economic	thinking	under	the	banner	of	‘critical	realism.’	See	the	essays	collected	in	Paul	Lewis	(2004).		
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individuality	that	was	unthinkable	in	a	premodern	age	when	a	range	of	Aristotelian	and/or	
Thomist	beliefs	conditioned	the	essential	terms	of	social	cooperation,	none	of	which	
catered	to	notions	of	“infinite	desire.”	They	may	also	have	a	regard	for	the	way	in	which	the	
demise	of	these	Aristotelian	and	Thomist	world	views	was	a	socio-cultural	precondition	for	
the	rise	of	modern	conceptions	of	individuality	as	an	agent	or	source	of	“infinite	desire.”	
Further	to	this,	they	may	also	have	a	regard	for	the	way	this	demise	itself	was	conditioned	
and	exacted	by	the	technological	transformation	of	methods	of	production	and	commercial	
exchange.	I	am	most	certainly	not	staging	a	moral	argument	here	for	a	return	to	Aristotelian	
and	Thomist	views	of	community	and	society.	I	am	only	making	the	point	that	an	invocation	
of	a	transcendent	‘economic	scarcity’	that	is	unconditioned	by	contingent	conventional	
frameworks	of	social	construction	becomes	rather	far-fetched	when	these	historical	
developments	are	taken	into	consideration.	
I	am	not	the	economist	in	this	discussion	and	I	will	not	attempt	to	provide	a	
bibliography	here	of	economists	who	are	currently	challenging	the	notion	of	‘transcendent	
scarcity.’	However,	I	am	quite	confident	that	one	would	not	search	long	to	come	up	with	a	
significant	list	and	that	the	scholarship	around	the	work	of	Karl	Polanyi	may	well	provide	
productive	leads	for	identifying	such	‘abnormal’	economic	inquiries.5	Let	me	again	stress	
that	I	am	not	in	the	least	proposing	this	minority	or	‘abnormal’	view	among	economists	as	
the	conclusively	‘correct’	or	‘better’	point	of	departure	for	economic	theory.	I	am	only	
suggesting	that	a	failure	to	bear	it	in	mind	as	a	constitutive	boundary	or	limit	within	the	field	
of	economic	inquiry	reduces	the	study	of	economics	to	a	disciplinary	and	conceptual	closure	
within	the	confines	of	which	the	task	of	rethinking	fundamental	assumptions	and	
propositions	becomes	impossible.	This	is	how	scientific	and	theoretical	enterprises	become	
thoughtless.	Thinking	begins	with	the	regard	for	the	irreducible	indeterminacy	of	
fundamental	theoretical	assumptions.	Again,	this	in	no	way	implies	a	rejection	of	these	
fundamental	assumptions.	But	it	requires	an	open	intellectuality	that	seeks	and	welcomes	
pertinent	challenges,	and	it	is	this	open	intellectuality	that	is	entirely	missing	from	D&K’s	
dismissal	of	my	arguments	regarding	“economic	scarcity.”	
	
																																																						
5	The	reason	why	I	believe	a	search	for	a	concept	of	economic	scarcity	that	relates	scarcity	to	concrete	social	
conceptions	of	need	and	thus	offers	a	significant	alternative	to	an	abstractly	conceived	notion	of	‘infinite	
desire’	that	reflects	no	social	embeddedness,	relates	exactly	to	Polanyi’s	(1975)	reflections	on	embedded	
economies.		
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Shooting	Themselves	in	the	Foot	…		
I	have	already	asserted	above	that	I	do	not	see	the	point	of	D&K’s	lesson	in	basic	economic	
terminology.	It	does	not	take	their	own	arguments	forward	and	ultimately	comes	across	as	a	
rhetorical	ploy	aimed	at	showing	the	legal	theorist	that	he	is	out	of	his	depth	in	this	
discussion.	I	will	now	substantiate	this	assertion	by	showing	that	the	only	real	achievement	
of	the	whole	ploy	is	to	offer	an	easier	way	of	making	the	point	that	I	endeavoured	to	make	
in	my	ODH	intervention.	In	this	regard,	they	can	be	considered	to	have	shot	themselves	
pointlessly	and	thoughtlessly	in	the	foot.	
I	raised	an	argument	regarding	redistribution	deficits	in	Europe	and	considered	it	
important	to	corroborate	it	with	an	argument	regarding	the	absence	of	any	paralysing	or	
fatally	debilitating	condition	of	‘economic	scarcity’	that	would	preclude	better	redistribution	
in	Europe.	What	D&K	are	telling	me	is	that	I	should	not	have	raised	the	corroborative	
argument	regarding	“economic	scarcity,”	considering	that	“economic	scarcity”	is	a	
conceptual	a-priori	of	scientific	economic	thinking	that	must	be	presupposed	in	all	questions	
of	social	distribution.	However,	by	proposing	the	acceptance	of	“economic	scarcity”	as	an	a-
priori	that	necessarily	informs	all	questions	of	redistribution,	they	effectively	reduce	it	to	an	
empty	term	(an	empty	signifier,	if	you	wish)	with	no	determined	significance	for	any	specific	
question	of	economic	redistribution.	If	“economic	scarcity”	is	always	around	as	a	result	of	a	
presupposed	constellation	of	infinite	desire	and	limited	resources,	those	who	are	seriously	
concerned	with	specific	redistribution	questions	may	as	well	reply	with	a	shrug	of	a	
shoulder:	All	right,	we	know	that	already,	but	please	just	allow	us	now	to	get	on	with	
looking	at	the	specifics	of	relative	abundance	and	pressing	need	in	order	to	see	how	one	
might	alleviate	the	hardship	and	frustration	that	invariably	spawn	patterns	of	serious	social	
malaise	(such	as	religious	radicalisation).	
To	rephrase	this	somewhat:	my	argument	regarding	the	constructed	status	of	all	
notions	of	“economic	scarcity”	was	an	endeavour	to	get	it	out	of	the	way	so	as	to	free	up	
the	question	of	economic	redistribution.	But	it	would	appear	that	I	should	thank	D&K	for	
doing	this	much	more	effectively	than	I	imagined	possible	at	the	time.	It	seems	it	was	all	
along	me	who	took	the	question	of	economic	scarcity	much	too	seriously	by	seeking	to	
deconstruct	it.	It	is	D&K	who	really	render	the	term	irrelevant	by	turning	the	assertion	of	its	
prevalence	into	an	invariably	valid	proposition	and	therefore	into	a	non-proposition.	So,	
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now	that	we	have	the	non-issue	of	economic	scarcity	well	and	truly	out	of	our	way,	let	us	
move	on	to	the	economic	redistribution	question	and	the	ordoliberal	response	to	it.	
	
Ordoliberalism	and	Social	Security	Politics	
Let	me	begin	this	section	by	returning	to	the	rest	of	the	passage	from	D&K’s	reaction	which	
was	already	partly	quoted	above:	
If	VDW	had	read	these	original	texts	or	at	least	the	contributions	of	scholars	with	a	
deep	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism	(such	as	Viktor	Vanberg),	he	would	
probably	have	started	questioning	his	own	assumptions	about	the	ordoliberal	
program.	The	ordoliberals,	especially	members	of	the	Freiburg	School,	were	very	
conscious	of	the	need	to	include	a	strong	social	welfare	element	in	their	program.	
After	all,	there	were	millions	of	war	widows,	orphans,	refugees,	expellees	and	
people	who	had	been	bombed	out	who	could	not	be	neglected	or	exposed	to	the	
harsh	winds	of	a	competitive	market	economy.	In	his	Grundsätze	der	
Wirtschaftspolitik	(1952),	Walter	Eucken,	the	most	prominent	proponent	of	the	
Freiburg	School,	acknowledges	explicitly	the	state’s	role	in	implementing	social	
policies.	He	subsumes	them	under	the	expression	“special	social	policy”	(Spezielle	
Sozialpolitik),	which	is	intended	to	attenuate	social	misfortune	and	economic	
tragedies	that	cannot	be	balanced	through	private	insurance	or	individual	assets.	
	
To	proceed,	allow	me	to	underline	that	ODH	clearly	acknowledges	and	commends	
the	hermeneutic	transformation	of	ordoliberal	thinking	in	the	post-war	years	that	allowed	it	
to	embrace	social	political	policies	that	were	not	part	of	its	original	conceptual	scheme.	It	
only	laments	the	way	these	post-war	ordoliberals	subsequently	appeared	to	have	lost	this	
hermeneutic	capacity	to	respond	to	new	historical	circumstances.	Please	consider	again	the	
following	passages:		
	
The	functional	synthesis	of	Protestant	ordo-liberal	concerns	with	fair	and	virtuous	
competition,	on	the	one	hand,	and	Catholic	social	welfare	concerns,	on	the	other,	
that	gave	rise	to	a	highly	efficient	social	market	economy	(soziale	Marktwirtschaft)	in	
post-war	Germany,	never	took	root	in	these	southern	European	countries	(van	der	
Walt,	2016:	88).	
	
In	this	respect,	German	post-war	ordo-liberalism	had	certainly	not	completely	lost	its	
hermeneutic	capacity	for	understanding	itself	differently	in	the	course	of	time	(a	
core	hermeneutic	capacity	according	to	Gadamer,	for	whom	human	understanding	
always	consists	in	understanding	differently).	The	filtered	or	default	ordo-liberalism	
that	emerged	from	the	politics	of	European	market	integration	has	evidently	lost	this	
capacity	for	renewed	contextual	self-understanding;	hence,	for	instance,	its	blind	
exportation	of	austerity	demands	to	countries	for	which	these	demands	are	ill-suited	
(ibid.:	92).		
	
I	shall	return	to	the	last	three	lines	of	the	second	passage	quoted	here	when	I	shift	
the	focus	to	the	question	of	ordoliberalism	and	Europe	below.	Suffice	it	for	now	to	note	
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again	the	well-known	compromise	between	a	Protestant	concern	with	virtuous	competition	
and	individual	freedom,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	Catholic	concern	with	social	security,	on	the	
other.	This	compromise	spawned	the	unique	concept	of	soziale	Markwirtschaft	in	post-war	
Germany.	It	is	especially	well	discussed	in	publications	of	Christian	Joerges	(e.g.	2010),	to	
which	my	understanding	of	this	history	is	much	indebted.	Several	scholars	nevertheless	
note,	however,	that	social	security	policies,	even	to	the	extent	that	they	were	integrated	
into	ordoliberal	thinking	in	the	post-war	years,	remained	a	Fremdkörper	(foreign	body)	in	
ordoliberal	economic	theory.	Most	or	at	least	many	theorists	associated	with	the	tradition	
continued	to	view	expansive	social	security	concerns	with	suspicion	(Lechevalier,	2015:	58).		
I	do	not	think	Eucken’s	work	can	be	completely	exempted	in	this	regard.	His	
Grundsätze	der	Wirtschaftspolitik	(Foundations	of	Political	Economy)	repeatedly	attributes	
problems	of	social	security	to	monopoly	formation	and	the	distortion	of	free	competition	by	
powerful	private	actors,	and	pays	little	attention	to	the	need	for	a	more	expansive	social	
politics	(Eucken,	2004:	13,	124-126,	314-318);	hence	also	his	very	poignant	observations	
regarding	the	need	for	an	economic	constitution	that	would	secure	the	free	competition	
without	which	the	fundamental	rights	protections	guaranteed	by	political	constitutions	–	
that	is,	liberal	democratic	constitutions	–	would	often	remain	little	more	than	formal	
guarantees	that	hardly	offer	substantive	protection	(ibid.:	48-53).	There	is	indeed	much	to	
be	said	for	and	learned	from	his	observations	in	this	regard,	especially	from	the	point	of	
view	of	constitutional	theorists	who	have	come	to	recognise	the	horizontal	effect	of	
fundamental	rights	–	the	constitutional	regulation	of	the	private	sphere	–	as	the	key	concern	
of	contemporary	constitutional	law	(see,	e.g.,	van	der	Walt,	2014).		
Again,	Eucken’s	acute	concern	with	private	power	as	the	main	threat	to	liberal	
democracy	is	truly	instructive.	However,	by	and	large	his	translation	of	social	security	
concerns	into	a	concern	with	adequate	anti-trust	or	competition	law	is	not	likely	to	convince	
theorists	of	social	democracy	(or	social	democrats	more	generally)	that	he	was	sufficiently	
sensitive	to	the	persistence	of	destructive	levels	of	social	inequality	in	contemporary	
capitalistic	societies.	His	recognition	of	the	need	for	a	special	or	exceptional	social	politics	
(Spezielle	Sozialpolitik)	that	D&K	invoke,	only	underlines	this.	Perhaps	one	should	be	
relieved	to	know	that	leading	ordoliberal	theorists	acknowledge	the	need	for	social	security	
measures	in	the	wake	of	exceptional	“economic	tragedies,”	as	D&K	put	it.	However,	the	
conviction	among	committed	social	democrats	that	social	inequality	is,	at	best,	only	partially	
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addressed	by	adequate	competition	law,	will	always	render	them	deeply	sceptical	of	Eucken	
and	the	ordoliberal	approach	outlined	here.	Only	if	one	is	prepared	to	take	a	rather	blunt	
Marxist	hard	line	that	considers	capitalism	itself	as	such	an	‘economic	tragedy’	–	a	hard	line	
with	which	few	social	democrats	would	be	comfortable	–	might	Eucken’s	“exceptional	social	
politics”	begin	to	measure	up	to	the	vast	dimensions	of	social	insecurity	that	a	mere	resort	
to	fair	competition	law	cannot	hope	to	address.	
From	a	regular	social	democratic	perspective,	however,	the	resort	to	rigorous	
competition	law	for	purposes	of	addressing	all	questions	of	social	malaise	pivots	on	a	
flagrant	underestimation	of	the	issues	at	hand.	This	social	democratic	point	of	view	would	
demand	a	much	more	incisive	understanding	of	the	notion	of	an	‘adequate	liberty	to	
compete’	if	this	notion	were	to	be	taken	as	the	key	to	all	economic	redistribution	questions.	
It	would	also	demand	a	much	broader	conception	of	competition	law	than	that	which	is	
current	in	ordoliberal	legal	and	economic	theory.	One	should	dismiss	the	idea	that	anti-
social	monopolies	are	the	exclusive	domain	of	excessively	powerful	companies.	One	should	
begin	to	think	of	the	monopolising	tendencies	entrenched	in	the	very	organisation	of	civil	
society	in	the	broadest	sense	of	the	word.	Monopolising	tendencies	begin	with	distributions	
of	education,	recreation	and	housing	facilities.	It	is	the	distribution	of	all	these	facilities	that	
excludes	masses	of	people	at	birth	from	competing	freely	with	those	who	happened	to	be	
born	on	the	right	side	of	the	railway	line.	Were	ordoliberals	to	extend	the	focus	of	their	
Ordnungspolitik	to	these	systemic	origins	of	economic	monopolisation,	they	would	begin	to	
realise	that	Sozialpolitik	is	not	spezielle	Politik,	but	an	ongoing	and	fundamental	concern	
with	the	sustenance	of	adequate	levels	of	social	equality	in	every	walk	of	life.				
	
Ordoliberalism	and	Europe		
D&K	write:	
	
The	sovereign	French	government	(that	would	certainly	oppose	VDW’s	implicit	claim	
of	being	influenced	by	an	ordoliberal	agenda	set	by	the	Germans)	decided	prior	to	
the	financial	crisis	not	to	support	the	[banlieues]	sufficiently.	Instead,	it	chose,	for	
example,	not	to	tax	the	rich	(which	is	in	line	with	VDW)	as	well	as	to	spend	resources	
preferably	on	a	large,	Bismarckian-style	welfare	state	known	to	perpetuate	social	
stratification,	with	the	inhabitants	of	the	cités	certainly	being	on	very	low	strata.	
	
When	one	reads	this	passage,	one	has	reason	to	wonder	with	some	dismay	whether	
D&K	have	been	taking	any	notice	of	the	pressing	political	problems	that	plagued	France	in	
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recent	years.	Had	they	done	so,	they	would	perhaps	not	have	talked	so	glibly	about	a	
“sovereign	French	government	…	that	would	certainly	oppose	VDW’s	claim	of	being	
influenced	by	an	ordoliberal	agenda	set	by	Germans.”		No	one	in	his	or	her	right	mind	would	
think	of	the	current	French	government	as	“influenced	by	an	ordoliberal	agenda	set	by	
Germans,”	and	I	surely	have	not	suggested	anything	of	the	kind.	What	everyone	who	knows	
a	little	about	current	French	politics	understands	well,	however,	is	that	successive	French	
governments	have	been	struggling	to	escape	from	an	EU-imposed	austerity	politics	that	
neither	convinced	nor	“influenced”	them.6	This	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	anti-EU	
politics	is	so	prominent	in	France,	both	on	the	far	right	and	on	the	far	left.	This	is	the	reason	
why	the	workers’	unions	in	France	are	so	Euro-sceptic.	This	is	also	the	main	narrative	behind	
the	dismal	failure	of	François	Hollande’s	centre-left	government	in	recent	years.	A	main	
pillar	of	Hollande’s	election	campaign	was	to	negotiate	the	relaxation	of	EU	austerity	
measures	with	the	leaders	of	EU	Member	States	such	as	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	who	
were	insisting	on	these	measures.	He	failed	and	his	government	foundered	ever	since.7	
D&K’s	observation	regarding	France’s	“large,	Bismarckian-style	welfare	state	known	
to	perpetuate	social	stratification,”	quoted	above,	certainly	merits	further	reflection.	There	
is	a	broad	perception	current	in	France	that	France’s	heavily	centralised	social	and	political	
structures	are	in	need	of	reform.	The	astounding	election	of	Emmanuel	Macron	as	the	
eighth	President	of	the	Fifth	Republic	is	in	large	part	due	to	his	announced	willingness	to	
bring	about	these	reforms.	One	can	leave	aside	the	question	whether	one	now	has	a	case	at	
hand	of	a	possible	future	French	leader	who	is	“influenced	by	an	ordoliberal	agenda	set	by	
Germans.”	I	will	ask	a	different	one	instead:	Suppose	France	would	want	to	persist	in	the	
years	to	come	with	old	governmental	traditions	–	call	them	Colbertism,	call	them	dirigisme,	
one	can	even	call	them	Bismarckian	were	one	to	forget	that	these	traditions	were	around	in	
France	long	before	Bismarck8	–	that	for	many	reasons	do	not	comply	with	ordoliberal	
principles	of	government.	What	would	happen	then?		
																																																						
6	The	so-called	Merkozy	years	could	be	an	exception	in	this	regard	(e.g.	Lechevalier,	2015:	74).		
7	Those	who	have	not	been	following	these	developments	in	recent	years	will	find	a	sobering	summary	in	
Serge	Halimi	(2017:	1,	16,	17).		
8	The	suggestion	here	is	not	that	Bismarckian	modes	of	centralised	social	welfare	government,	Colbertism	and	
dirigisme	are	the	same	in	all	respects,	but	they	are	certainly	comparable	with	regard	to	the	centralised	statism	
common	to	them	all.		
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For	these	state-centred	traditions	of	government	to	become	remotely	as	successful	
as	they	were	in	the	“thirty	glorious	years”	after	1945,	future	French	governments	would	
have	to	be	unshackled	from	the	especially	German-driven	austerity	demands	that	the	EU	is	
currently	imposing	on	France.9	The	same	would	be	the	case	if	France	wanted	to	reform	
these	traditions	in	a	way	that	would	not	imply	a	wholesale	forfeiture	of	its	own	
governmental	traditions.	Is	there	any	chance	that	a	politically	and	culturally	more	
heterogeneous	and	hospitable	EU	may	one	day	come	to	accept	and	accommodate	this	
“other	France”	or	this	“different	France”	(not	to	mention	a	possible	other	and	different	
Greece,	etc.)?	Or	are	the	options	Europe	is	facing	reduced	to	either	France	becoming	
another	Germany	and	the	French	good	Germans,	on	the	one	hand,	or	the	EU	falling	apart,	
on	the	other?	Is	the	underlying	message	here	really	that	this	German	way	is	the	only	way?	
Must	Europe	really	become	an	enlarged	Germany?	Judging	by	the	first	signs	sent	out	by	the	
determined	young	Macron,	Europe	may	well	need	to	plot	a	different	course	in	the	years	to	
come.10		
	
Austerity	not	an	Ordoliberal	thought?	
D&K	may	wish	to	respond	to	all	this	talk	of	EU-imposed	ordoliberal	austerity	demands	on	
France	as	fundamentally	miscued,	considering	that	the	roots	of	the	austerity	thinking	that	
have	taken	the	world	economy	hostage	towards	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century	do	not	
have	ordoliberal	origins.	This	is	clearly	their	suggestion	when	they	write:	
		
The	ideas	concerning	austerity	actually	originated	in	the	1980s	in	Thatcher’s	Britain	
and	Reagan’s	America,	where	the	concept	of	a	minimal	state,	propagated	by	
libertarian	economists	like	Friedrich	August	von	Hayek,	Milton	Friedman	and	Murray	
Rothbard,	received	much	attention.	From	there,	their	ideas	slowly	spilled	over	into	
the	states	of	the	European	continent.	In	other	words,	the	recipes	that	are	being	
applied	in	Europe	(including	Catholic	Poland),	but	also	in	the	US	today	are	not	
ordoliberal,	but	libertarian	or	neoliberal.	The	distinction	between	these	liberal	
schools	of	thought	is	much	more	complex	than	thinking	of	ordoliberalism	as	
‘neoliberalism	with	rules.’	At	the	heart	of	the	distinction	lies	the	role	of	the	state.	It	
seems	that	VDW	interestingly	chose	not	to	dig	deeper	into	these	crucial	differences,	
as	his	selection	of	references	indicates	(see	endnote	15).	
	
The	“endnote	15”	to	which	they	refer	concerns	my	references	to	a	considerable	list	
of	scholars	who	have	made	the	mistake	of	not	having	dug	deeper	into	the	crucial	
																																																						
9	See	Macron	(2016:	79)	for	a	clear	affirmation	of	the	need	for	state	investment	in	the	economy.	His	main	
economic	advisor,	Jean	Pisani-Ferry,	is	not	an	ordoliberal,	but	a	moderate	Keynesian	(see	Schubert,	2017).	
10	Macron	is	indeed	sending	out	strong	signals	that	he	intends	to	honour	these	traditions	(2016:	48).	
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differences	between	ordoliberalism,	neoliberalism	and	libertarianism.	Had	all	these	scholars	
dug	deeper	into	these	differences,	D&K	suggest,	they	would	not	have	attributed	austerity	
politics	to	ordoliberalism,	but	to	the	real	culprits,	namely,	neoliberalism	and	libertarianism.	
And	of	course,	then	I	would	also	not	have	been	led	astray	regarding	these	crucial	
differences.	
Now,	considering	this	predicament	of	so	many	scholars	out	there	being	so	ill	
informed	about	the	crucial	differences	between	ordoliberalism,	neoliberalism	and	
libertarianism	and	about	the	real	origins	of	austerity	economics,	it	would	seem	to	me	that	
there	may	well	be	a	real	incentive	for	ordoliberals	themselves	to	really	clear	up	this	
confusion,	especially	if	they	feel	uncomfortable	with	being	associated	with	the	austerity	
politics	that	the	EU	is	imposing	on	its	Member	States.	Why	don’t	those	“scholars	with	a	
deep	understanding	of	German	ordoliberalism	(such	as	Viktor	Vanberg)”	publish	an	
unambiguous	statement	that	ordoliberalism	should	not	be	associated	with	the	austerity	
economics	that	neoliberalism	and	libertarianism	have	been	imposing	on	the	world	in	recent	
years.	Considering	their	deep	understanding	of	the	movement	and	their	intimate	familiarity	
with	its	key	texts	–	and	considering	that	they	will	undoubtedly	be	recognised	as	
authoritative	spokesmen	for	the	tradition	–	they	are	clearly	in	the	best	position	to	clear	up	
this	pervasive	misunderstanding	that	is	shared,	one	should	note,	by	Jürgen	Habermas.11	
Such	a	categorical	clarification	will	also	give	them	the	opportunity	to	dissociate	themselves	
from	the	Schäubles	of	this	world,	who	must	also	have	gotten	their	austerity	ideas	–	see	the	
epigraph	above	–	from	neoliberals	and	libertarians	and	not	from	them.	And	one	can	also	
strongly	recommend	that	they	make	use	of	the	same	opportunity	to	denounce	the	
unforgiving	attitudes	of	the	German	government	and	the	German	media	in	the	ongoing	
Greek	crisis.	Were	prominent	ordoliberal	scholars	who	can	speak	authoritatively	on	behalf	
of	the	Freiburg	School	to	do	this,	they	might	well	be	surprised	how	ready	the	scholars	
mentioned	in	my	endnote	15	will	be	to	revise	their	positions.	Until	this	happens,	however,	
they	must	expect	that	those	of	us	who	are	supposedly	unable	to	discern	the	subtle	
differences	and	distinctions	to	which	D&K	allude,	will	continue	to	associate	ordoliberalism	
with	austerity	for	reasons	that	look	adequately	plausible	to	us.		
																																																						
11	 See	 Habermas	 (2016):	 “Und	 da	 sich	 die	 Bundesregierung	 seit	 2010	 über	 den	 Europäischen	 Rat	 mit	 den	
ordoliberalen	Vorstellungen	ihrer	Sparpolitik	gegen	Frankreich	und	die	Südeuropäer	durchsetzt	[...]”	
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The	reason	that	this	association	looks	adequately	plausible	to	me	concerns	the	very	
role	of	the	state	to	which	D&K	allude.	One	is	well	aware	that	one	can	distinguish	
ordoliberalism	from	classical	liberalism	on	the	basis	of	the	former’s	conviction	regarding	the	
active	role	the	state	must	play	in	sustaining	a	truly	liberal	market	and	preventing	it	from	
cartel	formations	that	distort	free	competition.	Classical	liberalism	is	clearly	different	in	this	
regard,	considering	its	much	closer	adherence	to	laissez-faire	principles.	Taking	one’s	key	
from	an	expression	of	Alexander	Rüstow,	one	may	well	distinguish	the	deism	of	classical	
liberalism,	and	the	deontology	of	the	ordoliberals	(Van	der	Walt,	2014:	246-252).	And	to	the	
extent	that	neoliberalism	and	libertarianism	are	both	closer	to	the	deism	of	classical	
liberalism,	they	surely	do	not	fit	well	into	the	deontological	approach	of	the	ordoliberals.	
But	this	is	where	the	important	difference	between	them	ends,	as	far	as	I	understand	the	
matter.	For	the	rest,	the	ordoliberals	would	seem	to	be	as	apprehensive	of	governmental	
practices	that	threaten	price	stability	and	undistorted	competition	as	any	other	branch	of	
“minimal	state”	liberalism	may	be.	The	infusion	of	money	into	an	economy	through	the	
procuration	of	either	state	or	private	debt	that	is	not	warranted	by	equivalent	levels	of	
savings,	would	appear	to	be	key	among	these	objectionable	practices	according	to	them.	
This	is	how	I	and,	I	believe,	many	other	scholars	understand	the	matter.	And	if	we	are	just	
wrong	in	this	regard,	I	am	sure	we	would	all	just	be	very	grateful	to	be	corrected	by	scholars	
with	a	“deep[er]	understanding”	of	the	ordoliberal	tradition.12	
	
Ordoliberalism	and	Protestantism		
Assuming	that	austerity	politics	reflects	a	predominantly	Protestant	approach	to	monetary	
stability,	is	the	underlying	message	of	the	ordoliberals	really	that	this	Protestant	way	is	the	
only	way?	D&K	will	surely	object	vociferously	to	this	way	of	putting	the	question.	They	
object	to	my	association	of	ordoliberalism	with	Protestantism.	However,	they	themselves	
																																																						
12	One	may	be	hard	pressed	to	find	express	references	to	notions	of	‘austerity’	in	ordoliberal	texts,	I	assume,	
but	the	principles	of	monetary	politics	that	Eucken	elaborates	in	Grundsätze	der	Wirtschaftspolitik	(the	
safeguarding	of	the	price	mechanism	as	the	foundational	principle	of	economic	government	[2004:	255];	the	
resulting	need	to	avoid	monetary	instability	as	far	as	possible,	irrespective	of	questions	regarding	the	justice	of	
the	system	[ibid.:	257];	the	explanation	of	monetary	instability	with	reference	to	the	creation	of	money	by	
banks	[through	credit	provision	that	is	not	corroborated	by	savings],	and	the	need	to	avoid	this	[ibid.:	258];	the	
need	to	sustain	monetary	stability	with	a	currency	constitution	[Währungsverfassung]	that	operates	
automatically	without	interference	from	central	banks	or	government	authorities	[ibid.:	257];	and		the	
dismissal	of	Keynesian	[ibid.:	286]	or	other	forms	of	Konjunkturpolitik	(ibid.:	308	–	312))	would	nevertheless	
seem	to	lay	down	the	blueprint	for	a	monetary	politics	that	can	for	all	practical	purposes	be	considered	
‘austere’	(or	at	the	very	least	have	the	potential	to	deliver	consistently	austere	outcomes).	
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unabashedly	associate	the	core	ideas	of	early	ordoliberal	thinking	with	a	Protestantism	that	
only	later	became	“enriched”	(!)	with	a	“Catholic	social	perspective.”	They	write:	
	
Regarding	the	connection	between	ordoliberalism	and	Protestantism,	VDW’s	
argument	remains	dubious	as	well	…	[W]hile	many	early	scholars	from	Freiburg	were	
undoubtedly	influenced	by	Protestantism,	they	are	only	one	fraction	within	German	
ordoliberalism.	Especially	after	Ludwig	Erhard	and	Alfred	Müller-Armack	enriched	
the	ideas	from	Freiburg	with	a	Catholic	social	perspective	to	form	the	social	market	
economy,	the	supposed	dominance	of	Protestant	thinking	in	ordoliberalism	that	
continues	until	today	is	doubtful.	
	
This	observation	that	Ludwig	Erhard	and	Alfred	Müller-Armack	–	both	Protestants,	
one	should	note13	–	enriched	the	ideas	from	Freiburg	with	a	“Catholic	social	perspective”	
evidently	makes	two	interesting	concessions:	1)	The	essential	Freiburg	thinking	was	
Protestant	in	its	orientation.	2)	In	the	post-war	years,	this	essentially	Protestant	thinking	of	
the	Freiburg	School	was	enriched	by	a	social	perspective	that	was	essentially	of	Catholic	
origin.	Now,	one	really	wonders	what	exactly	D&K	find	so	dubious	about	the	link	between	
ordoliberalism	and	Protestantism	that	I	invoke	in	my	NP	intervention	if	they	are	prepared	to	
basically	concede	the	point	themselves,	as	they	do	here.	One	also	marvels	at	how	prepared	
they	are	to	concede	in	the	same	breath	that	the	social	perspective	that	went	into	the	social	
market	economy	cannot	be	attributed	to	the	core	ideas	around	which	the	thinking	of	the	
Freiburg	School	developed,	but	had	to	be	imported	later	from	Catholic	backgrounds.	Little	
more	need	to	be	added	in	response	here,	apart	from	underlining	a	number	of	points	to	clear	
up	the	confusion	that	D&K	are	creating	with	these	concessions.	
Firstly,	the	Catholic	influence	on	the	ordoliberals	during	the	post-war	years	is	well	
known	and	surely	not	denied	or	ignored	in	my	ODH	intervention	(2016:	88).	Secondly,	
anyone	who	would	like	to	challenge	my	view	regarding	the	nonetheless	close	or	even	
essential	link	between	Protestantism	and	ordoliberalism	firmly,	should	perhaps	also	
consider	the	sources	on	which	I	rely	and	be	ready	to	challenge	these	sources	as	well.	In	this	
respect,	I	would	sincerely	like	to	hear	whether	D&K	would	like	to	challenge	Philip	Manow’s	
arguments	regarding	die	protestantische	Tiefengrammatik	des	Ordoliberalismus,	and	if	so,	
on	what	grounds	they	would	do	so.	The	lack	of	counter-argument	that	D&K	display	here	
																																																						
13	For	Müller-Armack,	see	Josef	Hien’s	reference	in	this	issue	to	Dieter	Haselbach’s	observation	that	Müller-
Armack’s	“Protestant	confession	was	not	without	impact	on	his	scientific	work.”	As	for	Erhard,	he	had	a	
Catholic	father	and	a	Protestant	mother,	but	Erhard	and	his	siblings	were	all	baptised	as	Protestants.	See	
Ludwig	Erhard	Zentrum	(2017).		
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becomes	glaringly	conspicuous	when	one	considers	the	meticulous	way	in	which	Manow	
unpacks	both	the	historical	and	dogmatic	links	between	ordoliberalism	and	Protestantism.	
Be	it	as	it	may,	none	of	the	above	observations	inanely	suggest	that	there	never	
were	Protestants	with	strong	social	sensibilities	or	Catholics	with	strong	individualistic	and	
competition-oriented	sensibilities,	both	in	Germany	and	in	France	(as	well	as	elsewhere).	
Surely,	admirers	and	followers	of	Walter	Eucken,	whose	theories	incorporated	so	much	
from	Max	Weber’s	concern	with	Idealtypen,	could	have	been	expected	to	respond	a	little	
more	discerningly	to	this	part	of	my	ODH	intervention.	
	
“A	Huntington-Type	Clash”	of	Civilisations?	
D&K	conclude	their	response	to	my	ODH	intervention	with	this	passage:	
	
We	conclude	with	some	remarks	on	VDW’s	vision	of	jihadist	terrorism	resulting	from	
a	Huntington-type	clash	of	(de-hermeneuticised)	religions	or	quasi-religions.	While	
we	mainly	accuse	the	author	of	a	superficial	(de-hermeneutic!)	reading	of	
ordoliberalism	and	the	Freiburg	School	of	economics,	we	observe	the	same	problem	
with	the	idea	of	de-hermeneuticised	Islam.	VDW’s	position	is	somewhat	reminiscent	
of	Gilles	Kepel	in	his	debate	with	Olivier	Roy	on	whether	the	current	threats	posed	
by	terrorism	result	from	a	radicalisation	of	Islam	or	from	an	Islamicisation	of	
radicalism	(e.g.	New	York	Times,	2016).14	Combined	with	de-hermeneuticisation,	this	
would	entail	Islam	–	somewhat	mechanically	–	becoming	“more	fundamentalist	(…)	
and	less	interpretive”	(p.	80);	the	argument	over		the	radicalisation	of	Islam	
therefore	becomes	oversimplified,	as	the	process	of	radicalisation	is	not	explained.	
Roy,	on	the	other	hand,	argues	more	psychologically	and	places	greater	emphasis	on	
individual	behaviour.	Following	his	line	of	reasoning,	a	specific	combination	of	
individual	traits	and	environmental	influences	causes	radicalisation.	This	is	not	
simple	mechanics,	but	can	be	traced	back	to	concrete	causes.	In	addition,	Roy	
considers	the	terrorists’	religious	beliefs	in	the	context	of	a	jihadism	that	is	strictly	
marginal	to	Islam.	
	
The	same	question	that	I	have	posed	above	with	reference	to	Manow	must	again	be	
posed	here.	Do	D&K	really	wish	to	take	issue	with	Navid	Kermani’s	intimate	knowledge	of	
the	modern	development	of	the	Islam	religion	on	which	I	rely	in	ODH?	If	so,	what	are	their	
arguments?	Their	sparse	reference	to	the	Kepel–Roy	debate	does	not	seem	to	offer	any	
clear	line	of	contention	that	significantly	challenges	the	views	I	took	from	Kermani.	It	is	
noteworthy	that	Charlotte	Heath-Kelly,	in	her	response	to	ODH,	to	which	I	turn	later	below,	
relies	on	Kepel	and	Bernard	Lewis	for	an	express	confirmation	of	the	modernisation	thesis	
																																																						
14	For	a	popular	account	of	the	debate,	see	New	York	Times	(2016).	For	introductions	to	the	works	of	each	
scholar,	see	Roy	(2004)	and	Kepel	(2006).	
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that	I	gleaned	from	Kermani’s	writings.	D&K,	with	little	argumentation	to	back	them	up,	
simply	suggest	Roy’s	views	should	be	given	preference	here.	
	
If	Roy	is	right,	and	there	are	indeed	good	reasons	to	honour	his	arguments,	VDW’s	
clash	of	religions	story	is	indeed	inaccurate	from	both	ends.	
	
One	should	note	that	this	is	D&K’s	closing	paragraph	and	sentence.	They	simply	
leave	the	scene	of	the	argument	with	this	cavalier	final	statement.	What	may	be	their	
considered	reasons	for	doing	so?	What	are	the	good	reasons	for	assuming	Roy,	and	Roy	
alone,	is	right	here,	and	Kermani	and	Kepel	(and	Lewis,	and	all	others	who	disagree	with	
Roy)	are	simply	wrong?	On	what	expertise	or	immersed	reading	are	D&K	relying	for	their	
astoundingly	authoritative	assessment	of	the	relative	merits	of	these	authors	and	the	state	
of	the	debate	between	them?	Would	anyone	who	is	really	immersed	in	this	debate	come	to	
such	a	quick	and	facile	conclusion?	But	many	more	questions	abound	here:	Why	do	they	
impute	a	“clash	of	religions”	story	to	ODH	when	there	is	not	the	slightest	evidence	of	any	
focused	intention	to	put	forward	such	a	story	in	it?	Why	is	it	that	D&K	cannot	see	that	the	
thesis	regarding	the	modern	radicalisation	of	Islam	plays	almost	no	role	in	my	ODH	
arguments	apart	from	furnishing	it	with	the	concept	with	which	I	proceed	to	analyse	
Western	or	European	frames	of	mind?15	Why	can’t	they	see	that	the	whole	line	of	argument	
in	ODH	(regarding	the	socio-economic	distress	and	frustration	that	contribute	to	religious	
radicalisation)	resonates	in	many	respects	as	much	with	the	psychological	“Islamicisation	of	
Radicalism”	argument	that	they	attribute	to	Roy	as	it	does	with	the	broader	semantic	
“radicalisation	of	Islam”	argument	attributable	to	Kepel	(and	others)?	
Frankly,	I	cannot	see	why	one	should	subscribe	exclusively	to	either	of	these	lines	of	
arguments,	and	suspect	(as	a	non-expert	in	this	specific	debate,	no	doubt,	but	as	a	social	
science	scholar	with	many	years	of	experience	of	this	kind	of	debate)	that	many	experts	in	
the	field	would	probably	want	to	consider	both	arguments	worthy	of	consideration	for	
purposes	of	understanding	a	complex	development	with	multiple	elements	and	facets.	But	
again,	it	is	simply	astounding	how	D&K,	who	do	not	count	as	experts	in	the	field,	as	far	as	I	
can	discern,	simply	begin	to	promote	one	of	these	competing	arguments	for	purposes	of	
																																																						
15	After	having	dedicating	roughly	two	paragraphs	(out	of	twenty-five	pages)	to	introducing	the	concept,	I	wrote:	
“It	is,	however,	not	with	the	de-hermeneuticisation	of	Islamic	cultures	that	I	wish	to	take	issue	in	what	follows.	
I	would	like	to	look,	instead,	at	the	vast	and	increasing	dehermeneuticisation	that	has	taken	root	in	European	
societies.”	
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ending	their	response	with	a	loud	parting	shot.16	It	is	best	to	say	as	little	as	possible	about	
this	kind	of	scholarship.	But	one	should	note	–	perhaps	for	the	benefit	of	students	and	
future	scholars	–	the	sad	lack	of	scholarly	curiosity	and	responsibility	that	allows	them	so	
easily	to	forego	careful	engagement	and	argumentation.	I	leave	it	to	the	readers	to	consider	
this	well	and	judge	it	for	themselves,	but	D&K	surely	do	not	leave	me	with	the	impression	
that	they	have	engaged	with	the	Roy-Kepel	debate	for	the	sake	of	getting	to	the	bottom	of	
it	and	articulating	a	carefully	considered	opinion	about	it.	The	impression	with	which	they	
leave	me	is	that	they	simply	dragged	in	the	debate	by	its	coat	tails	for	the	sake	of	ending	
their	piece	with	some	sort	of	rhetorical	crescendo.	They	surely	do	not	leave	me	with	the	
impression	that	they	are	still	guided	by	scholarly	curiosity	and	the	wish	to	offer	a	careful	and	
responsible	point	of	view.	
When	I	look	back	at	all	the	aspects	of	their	response	to	my	ODH	intervention	with	
which	I	took	issue	above,	it	strikes	me	that	a	lack	of	a	real	concern	with	curious,	careful	and	
responsible	scholarship	burdens	almost	every	line	of	what	they	have	written	in	reaction	to	
my	ODH	intervention.	I	use	the	word	“reaction”	here	in	order	to	avoid	the	word	“response”	
now.	I	am	left	with	the	impression	that	they	have	not	argued	with	me	or	responded	to	me.	
My	sense	is	that	they	have	sent	me	a	reaction	devoid	of	both	a	response	and	the	
responsibility	that	conditions	a	response.	And	this	leads	me	to	the	final	point	that	I	wish	to	
make	with	regard	to	D&K’s	reaction	to	my	ODH	intervention.	They	end	up	portraying	
ordoliberal	thinking	as	devoid	of	responsibility.	I	may	not	have	the	“deep	understanding”	of	
ordoliberal	thinking	that	D&K	expect	from	their	interlocutors,	but	I	have	read	enough	of	
Eucken’s	work	and	enough	about	it	to	know	that	he	was	a	formidably	courageous	and	
responsible	person	and	scholar.	One	may	want	to	differ	with	him	on	many	points,	but	his	
work	cannot	be	considered	“irresponsible.”		And	this	is	sadly	exactly	what	D&K	end	up	doing	
in	their	reaction	to	my	ODH	intervention.	They	portray	the	ordoliberal	tradition	as	a	school	
of	thought	with	no	sense	of	historical	responsibility,	as	I	will	show	in	what	follows.	
	
Ordoliberalism	Is	Not	Responsible	…		
																																																						
16	If	D&K	took	recourse	to	the	conditional	mode	of	the	phrase	“If	Roy	is	right”	to	suggest	they	are	not	taking	
sides	here,	as	I	contend,	they	would	surely	be	stripping	this	whole	concluding	paragraph	of	the	only	bit	of	
contrived	substance	–	Roy’s	argument	and	“the	good	reasons	for	honouring	it”	–	on	which	it	hangs.		
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“Ordoliberalism	Is	Not	Responsible	for	Jihadist	Terrorism	in	Europe,”	reads	the	title	of	D&K’s	
reply	to	my	ODH	intervention.	The	explanation	for	this	title	would	seem	to	rest	on	the	
denial	of	a	chain	of	causal	links	between	jihad	terrorism	and	ordoliberalism	that	they	
attribute	to	my	ODH	intervention.	The	following	passages	put	forward	their	essential	
contentions	in	this	regard:	
We	strongly	doubt	that	the	simple	mechanics	of	VDW’s	argument	support	the	
assertion	that	–	with	or	without	a	process	of	de-hermeneuticisation	–	Protestant	
ethics	led	to	ordoliberalism,	which	resulted	in	an	imposed	austerity	in	France	and	
ultimately	jihadist	terrorism.	This	causal	chain	is	not	only	highly	questionable,	but	
also	its	underlying	assumptions	are,	in	fact,	inaccurate.	
	
VDW	asserts	that	a	lack	of	resources	(or	at	least	the	prevailing	belief	in	“economic	
scarcity”)	has	substantially	contributed	to	the	social	unrest	in	Molenbeek,	Belgium,	
or	the	cités	around	Paris.	The	resulting	socioeconomic	grievances	allegedly	spawned	
terrorism.	While	this	claim	may	possibly	have	some	merit,	though	the	mono-
causality	of	it	is	at	least	questionable,	VDW	falsely	accuses	ordoliberal	economic	
theory	of	a	de-politicisation	(or,	how	he	puts	it,	de-hermeneuticisation)	of	the	notion	
of	resource	scarcity.	
	
Any	honest	attempt	to	come	to	grips	with	these	passages	would	surely	want	to	ask	
whether	their	authors	consider	their	reading	of	my	ODH	intervention	an	expression	of	good	
faith	and	a	sincere	intention	to	engage	with	the	essential	thoughts	that	the	intervention	
puts	forward.	Have	D&K	asked	themselves	for	a	moment	whether	anyone	with	a	reasonably	
developed	sense	of	what	counts	as	a	good	social	theoretical	line	of	argument	would	come	
up	with	the	syllogistic	sequence	“Protestant	ethics	led	to	ordoliberalism;	ordoliberalism	
resulted	in	imposed	austerity;	austerity	resulted	in	jihadism;	Protestant	ethics	and	
ordoliberalism	thus	caused	jihadism”?	
Or,	to	put	the	question	differently,	do	D&K	really	consider	it	good	scholarly	practice	
to	reduce	an	argument	to	a	simplistic	caricature	for	purposes	of	considering	themselves	
unchallenged	by	it,	and	simply	not	addressed	by	it?		To	rephrase	the	question	one	more	
time	so	as	to	bring	into	play	the	essential	point	that	I	wish	to	make	here:	Is	it	a	sign	of	either	
scholarly	or	social	responsibility	–	of	owning	up	to	one’s	responsibility	–	when	one	reduces	
the	question	of	responsibility	to	a	narrow	consideration	of	whether	one	can	be	identified	as	
an	exclusive	and	direct	cause	in	a	mechanistic	“mono-causal”	sequence	of	consequences?	
Or	is	the	inclination	to	consider	responsibility	in	these	terms	not	indeed	the	sign	of	the	wish	
to	absolve	oneself	from	responsibility	as	far	as	possible,	that	is,	from	all	but	the	most	direct	
forms	of	causal	involvement.	If	this	is	what	is	going	on	in	D&K’s	reaction	to	my	ODH	
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intervention,	does	the	retort	“Ordoliberalism	is	not	responsible…”	not	indeed	amount	to	a	
confirmation	of	irresponsibility?	Would	the	sign	of	social	responsibility	in	a	time	of	crisis	–	
the	crisis	of	religious	radicalisation	among	young	people	that	leads	to	barbarous	acts	of	
jihadism	included	–	not	much	rather	be	reflected	in	the	willingness	to	consider	the	many	
ways	in	which	existing	modes	of	thinking	and	doing,	including	one’s	own,	may	be	
contributing	to	the	crisis	in	ways	that	are	not	unambiguously	evident?	
I	shall	leave	it	to	the	reader	to	decide	whether	D&K’s	portrayal	of	my	arguments	is	
fair	and	accurate.	For	my	part,	I	cannot	see	why	anyone	with	a	sound	mind	would	want	to	
argue	that	Protestantism	led	to	ordoliberalism,	ordoliberalism	resulted	in	austerity,	and	
austerity	caused	jihadism.	What	I	can	imagine	someone	arguing,	however,	and	what	I	
believe	I	argued	or	at	least	endeavoured	to	argue,	is	something	to	the	following	effect:	
Ordoliberalism’s	consideration	of	a	system	of	fair	and	virtuous	competition	as	the	most	
crucial	concern	of	state	politics	can	be	traced	to	the	Protestant	ethics	of	hard	work	and	
frugality	that	Max	Weber	already	identified	as	key	to	the	rise	of	modern	capitalism.	To	the	
extent	that	the	tradition	of	ordoliberal	thinking	by	and	large	considers	its	social	
responsibility	restricted	to	the	sustenance	of	fair	and	virtuous	competition,	it	surely	does	
not	address	or	offer	a	meaningful	response	to	questions	regarding	extensive	economic	
redistribution	that	might	facilitate	the	incisive	and	deep	social	reconstruction	needed	for	
improving	the	conditions	of	social	malaise	that	evidently	prompt	radical	anti-social	conduct	
such	as	religious	extremism	and	religiously	inspired	terrorism.	So	far,	there	is	no	mention	in	
this	line	of	argument	of,	or	any	allusion	to,	a	causal	connection	–	let	alone	the	“mono-
causal”	connection	that	D&K	impute	to	me17	–	between	ordoliberalism	and	the	social	
conditions	that	are	conducive	to	anti-social	behaviour.	At	stake	is	merely	an	observation	
regarding	ordoliberalism’s	failure	to	offer	a	meaningful	response	to	these	conditions	(and	
indeed	then	an	observation	regarding	a	failure	to	respond	and	a	failure	to	take	
responsibility).	
Only	then	–	having	observed	this	ordoliberal	failure	to	respond	–	does	my	argument	
tighten	its	screws	for	purposes	of	invoking	an	ordoliberal	“legacy.”	The	legacy	invoked	here,	
one	should	note	clearly,	is	nevertheless	not	jihad	terrorism,	but	“Europe’s	states	of	
																																																						
17	D&K	write:	“The	resulting	socioeconomic	grievances	allegedly	spawned	terrorism.	While	this	claim	may	
possibly	have	some	merit,	though	the	mono-causality	of	it	is	at	least	questionable…”	
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emergency.”	And	the	gist	of	this	part	of	the	argument	is	this:	If	one	actively	and	effectively	
promotes	–	or	at	least	passively	but	conspicuously	condones,	thereby	contributing	
effectively	to	the	entrenching	of	–	an	austerity	politics	that	inhibits	incisive,	timely	and	
ongoing	ameliorative	responses	to	serious	conditions	of	social	malaise,	one	certainly	also	
contributes	very	effectively	to	the	need	for	urgent	or	emergency	responses	when	the	
situation	gets	out	of	hand.	Under	these	circumstances,	it	becomes	accurate	and	apt	to	
consider	an	ensuing	state	of	emergency	a	“legacy.”	Again,	I	wish	to	leave	it	to	the	reader	to	
judge,	but	I	personally	and	honestly	do	not	think	there	is	anything	in	this	argument	that	
suggests	ordoliberalism	is	the	cause,	let	alone	the	“mono-cause,”	of	jihad	terrorism.	I	trust	a	
brief	recollection	of	the	following	passage	from	ODH	can	serve	as	a	helpful	starting	point	for	
the	reassessment	that	I	consider	necessary	here:		
The	perspective	elaborated	in	this	article	certainly	requires	a	willingness	from	
readers	and	interlocutors	to	reconsider	dominant	views	of	looking	at	the	problem	or	
crisis	that	one	is	facing	here.	The	suggestion	that	one	of	the	roots	of	the	current	
wave	of	jihad	terror	in	Europe	can	be	traced	to	a	European	fundamentalism	that	is	
as	extreme	as	the	Islamic	fundamentalism	behind	the	terrorism,	may	well	come	
across	as	counter-intuitive	and	even	scandalous	to	some	readers….	This	perspective	
is	nevertheless	put	forward	here	for	the	sake	of	opening	up	other	ways	of	thinking	
about	the	crisis	Europe	is	facing	today.	It	should	also	be	stressed	that	the	endeavour	
to	open	up	a	different	perspective	here	is	not	at	all	accompanied	by	the	claim	that	it	
offers	a	comprehensive	or	conclusive	solution	to	the	crisis	at	hand.	It	is	just	a	first	
step	towards	thinking	differently	about	this	crisis.18  
	
Against	the	background	of	this	passage,	but	also	in	view	of	the	way	in	which	I	
structured	my	arguments	in	ODH,	I	sincerely	believe	the	imputation	of	a	monocausal	
argument	to	my	ODH	intervention	rests	on	a	construction	of	someone	who	prefers	not	to	
take	responsibility	under	circumstances	in	which	all	responsible	persons	and	parties	
involved	would	do	so,	and	can	do	so,	without	having	to	admit	blame,	let	alone	exclusive	
blame.	If	this	is	indeed	the	preference	of	ordoliberals,	ordoliberals	are	indeed	“not	
responsible,”	as	D&K	suggest.	And	this	leaves	one	to	ponder	the	worrying	possibility	that	
European	politics	may	be	deeply	influenced	by	a	way	of	thinking	that	is	quite	evidently	
unconcerned	by	its	own	irresponsibility,	a	way	of	thinking,	moreover,	that	would	evidently	
no	longer	be	worthy	of	Walter	Eucken’s	formidable	legacy.		
	
Constructive	Invitations	to	Think	Further		
																																																						
18	The	emphasis	on	“one	of	the	roots”	is	added	here.	
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The	observations	regarding	an	ordoliberal	lack	of	responsibility	with	which	Section	I	ends	
above	can	all	be	traced	to	the	disciplinary	refusal	to	think	that	I	invoke	earlier	in	the	section.	
When	I	turn	now	to	what	I	deem	the	constructive	invitations	to	think	further	sent	to	me	by	
Josef	Hien,	Charlotte	Heath-Kelly,	Emmanuel-Pierre	Guittet,	Filipe	dos	Reis	and	Ben	Kamis,	I	
would	likewise	like	to	link	these	invitations	to	think	further	to	a	willingness	to	take	
responsibility	and	to	alert	European	politics	to	some	of	its	most	worrying	features.	I	will	
address	each	of	these	invitations	individually	in	this	section.	
	
Hien,	Resurgent	German	Ordoliberalism	&	Europe’s	Ideational	Monocultures		
I	thank	Josef	Hien	for	substantiating	the	key	arguments	regarding	ordoliberalism	in	Europe	
advanced	in	my	ODH	intervention	and	for	doing	so	with	reference	to	a	rich	background	of	
knowledge	and	reading	that	I	can	only	admire	and	from	which	I	stand	to	learn	much	still.	I	
wish	to	pause	here	to	reflect	only	on	the	three	elements	of	his	response	from	which	I	have	
already	learned	much	and	which	I	also	deem	worthy	of	much	further	thought	and	reflection	
than	that	which	is	immediately	possible	in	what	follows.	The	first	point	concerns	my	failure	
to	note	the	specific	context	of	the	resurgence	of	ordoliberalism	in	Germany	since	the	1980s,	
and	the	impression	I	create	that	ordoliberalism	has	continuously	dominated	German	
economic	and	political	thinking	in	the	wake	of	World	War	II.	The	second	concerns	the	as	yet	
unconfirmed	status	of	the	hypothesis	that	ordoliberalism	spread	from	Germany	to	Europe	
through	the	European	Union	Treaties.	And	the	third	pertains	to	my	failure	to	note	the	other	
fundamentalisms	and	ideational	monocultures	spawned	by	the	resurgence	of	ordoliberalism	
in	Germany	and	Europe	since	the	1980s.	
My	ODH	intervention	has	indeed	not	been	attentive	to	the	fact	that	ordoliberalism	
has	not	just	always	been	around	in	Germany,	but	also	enjoyed	a	very	specific	resurgence	
since	the	1980s.	The	first	response	to	Hien’s	observations	in	this	regard	should	be	to	just	
admit	to	a	lack	of	adequate	knowledge	of	these	specifics	of	the	history	of	ordoliberal	
thinking	in	post-war	Germany.	I	assumed	that	the	prominence	of	ordoliberal	thinking	in	the	
development	of	Germany’s	social	market	economy	during	the	years	after	the	war	also	
amounted	to	a	relatively	dominant	position	for	it	in	German	political	thinking	throughout	
this	period	and	am	grateful	for	Hien’s	correction	in	this	regard.	I	also	find	the	developments	
that	he	explores	and	puts	forward	as	possible	reasons	for	the	resurgence	of	ordoliberal	
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thinking	since	the	1980s	and	especially	in	the	1990s	–	the	economic	problems	in	the	wake	of	
Germany’s	re-unification,	the	changes	that	the	re-unification	caused	in	the	electoral	
landscape,	and	the	massive	privatization	of	state-owned	companies,	land	and	housing	stock	
–	cogent.	They	all	also	offer	significant	food	for	thought.	One	of	the	first	prompts	for	further	
reflection	on	this	history	that	comes	to	mind	in	this	regard,	surely	concerns	the	question	
whether	the	future	of	Europe	and	European	integration	should	be	held	hostage	by	the	
unique	exigencies	of	the	German	re-unification.	
This	of	course	already	leads	one	to	the	question	of	the	unconfirmed	status	of	any	
contention	that	ordoliberalism	infiltrated	the	rest	of	Europe,	or	at	least	the	EU,	through	its	
incorporation	in	the	Treaties	of	the	EU,	notably	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	as	well	as	through	
the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	of	1998/9	and	the	Fiscal	Compact	of	2012.	I	am	happy	to	
accept,	as	Hien	suggests,	that	the	controversy	around	the	Maastricht	Treaty	is	still	
unresolved	as	a	result	of	the	embargo	on	crucial	archive	material.	I	am	also	happy	to	accept,	
as	he	suggests	further,	that	the	influential	ideas	and	lines	of	thought	that	led	to	a	broad	
acceptance	of	the	governmental	principles	incorporated	in	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	
and	the	Fiscal	Compact	among	EU	Member	States	may	well	have	included	neoliberal	
convictions	that	took	root	in	these	Member	States	independently	of	any	German	or	
ordoliberal	influence.	I	nevertheless	wish	to	offer	in	response	here	an	Arendtian	regard	for	
the	way	perceptions	and	appearances	count	in	politics	(van	der	Walt,	2012).	The	perception	
that	ordoliberal	principles	and	a	German	hard	line	on	austerity	economics	are	entrenched	in	
the	EU	treaties	and	other	EU	instruments,	and	via	this	entrenchment	imposed	on	the	rest	of	
the	EU,	has	become	so	pervasive	–	a	quick	look	at	the	relevant	literature	and	journalism	
confirms	this	very	readily19	–	that	it	has	become	a	political	reality	that	can	no	longer	be	
dismissed	as	a	myth.	This	political	reality	is	further	corroborated	by	the	strident	way	in	
which	German	political	leaders	advocate	their	austerity	visions	for	the	rest	of	Europe	(see	
again	the	epigraph	above).	
Against	this	background,	the	rise	of	other	ideational	monocultures	in	Europe	–	such	
as	those	reflected	in	the	notion	of	a	contre-attaque	de	l’Empire	latin	contemplated	by	
Agamben	and	the	anti-Protestant	statements	voiced	by	Greek	politicians	to	which	Hien	
refers	–	should	surprise	no	one.	The	idea	of	a	contre-attaque	latin	is	largely	a	myth	with	very	
																																																						
19	See	again	the	publications	cited	in	footnote	15	of	my	ODH	intervention.	
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little	political	purchase,	as	the	lack	of	support	for	Greece	and	empathy	with	its	plight	from	
the	side	of	other	Southern	European	countries	makes	all	too	clear.	However,	the	fact	that	
one	of	Europe’s	leading	philosophers	discerns	potential	in	this	myth	for	some	emancipatory	
release	here,	should	give	us	pause	for	careful	reflection	on	the	real	state	of	European	
politics.	How	long	will	the	leaders	of	Europe,	who	have	the	power	to	bring	about	an	
imaginative	and	significant	hermeneutic	change	of	fundamental	political	perceptions	in	
Europe,	allow	the	already	significant	distrust	between	the	North	and	the	South	to	deepen?	
How	long	will	they	risk	the	possible	development	of	new	geopolitical	alliances	that	will	send	
the	ideal	of	the	ever-closer	union	of	the	peoples	of	Europe	to	the	rubbish	heap	of	half-
baked	ideological	experiments?	These	questions	are	especially	pertinent	in	a	time	when	the	
most	powerful	nation	on	earth	apparently	no	longer	sees	any	reason	for	supporting	the	
further	integration	of	Europe,	as	it	did	in	the	past.	I	believe	it	is	the	merit	of	Hien’s	response	
to	my	ODH	intervention	to	open	up	these	lines	of	thought,	instead	of	closing	them	down,	
and	he	deserves	not	only	my	appreciation,	but	the	appreciation	of	everyone	who	ascribes	to	
the	ideal	of	a	truly	political	integration	of	Europe	and	therefore	resists	the	reality	of	an	
imposed	market	integration	that	is	grafted	on	rules	favoured	by	the	strongest	players	in	this	
market.	
	
Heath-Kelly	and	the	Militarised	Fundamentalism	of	Foreign	Intervention		
Charlotte	Heath-Kelly	writes:		
Van	Der	Walt’s	piece	could	be	strengthened	by	an	engagement	with	a	different	feature	of	
Eurocentric	fundamentalism:	the	persistent	military	interventionism,	borne	of	the	historical	
colonial	figurations	of	many	Western	European	states,	which	directly	contributes	to	the	
formation	of	militant	groups	and	structures	their	counter-hegemonic	ideology.	While	Van	
Der	Walt	highlights	the	economic	fundamentalism	of	neoliberalism,	the	militarised	
fundamentalism	of	foreign	intervention	is	an	equally,	if	not	more,	prominent	contributing	
factor	to	political	violence.	
	
Heath-Kelly	unpacks	the	key	contention	put	forward	here	with	ample	evidence	of	the	
directly	parallel	relation	between	Western	military	interventionism	and	the	counter-
hegemonic	ideologies	of	militant	groups	that	eventually	translate	into	acts	of	terrorism.	And	
it	is	in	this	regard	that	she	points	out	“an	unintentional	reproduction	of	certain	aspects	of	
the	European	fundamentalist	discourse	–	especially	the	silencing	of	the	self-explanation	of	
militancy	by	its	perpetrators,	and	the	role	of	militarised	foreign	policy	in	causing	terrorism”	-	
in	my	ODH	intervention.	The	point	she	makes	here	emanates	from	a	fine	and	close	reading	
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of	my	text	and	it	is	worthwhile	quoting	in	full	what	I	consider	the	sharp	end	of	her	
contention	in	this	regard:		
But	I	criticize	the	unintentional	reproduction	of	certain	aspects	of	the	European	
fundamentalist	discourse	–	especially	the	silencing	of	the	self-explanation	of	
militancy	by	its	perpetrators,	and	the	role	of	militarised	foreign	policy	in	causing	
terrorism	[-	in	van	der	Walt’s	text].	This	reproduction	of	discursive	silences	is	
especially	evident	in	the	article’s	discussion	of	airstrikes	and	the	Syria	conflict.	VdW	
is	technically	correct	when	he	outlines	the	‘increased	bombing’	of	Syria	which	
followed	the	Paris	attacks;	however,	this	allusion-by-default	to	previous	French	
bombings	is	not	enough	if	we	want	to	understand	the	reciprocal	violent	
fundamentalisms	of	Europe	and	militant	struggle.	The	French	airstrikes	began	in	
Syria	on	September	27th,	2015	(two	months	before	ISIS	attacked	Paris)	as	part	of	a	
dominant	French	foreign	policy	towards	the	Middle	East	–	reinforcing	and	
developing	“[France’s]	self-perception	as	a	great	power”	(Ramani,	2015).	Two	
months	later,	ISIS	gunmen	were	reported	to	shout	“This	is	for	Syria!”	to	the	
assembled	audience	in	the	Bataclan	theatre	before	opening	fire	(ITV	News,	2015).	
Given	this	explanation	by	the	perpetrators,	and	the	social	scientific	research	which	
connects	interventionism	with	a	militant	response,	we	should	explore	this	link	
between	the	militarist	fundamentalism	of	Europe	and	the	United	States	and	the	
wave	of	terrorist	bombings.	But	for	all	the	notable	analysis	of	European	neoliberal	
and	cultural	fundamentalism	within	van	der	Walt’s	discussion	of	terrorism	and	
counter-terrorism,	his	article	silences	the	voice	of	the	Paris	perpetrators	-	and	of	ISIS	
and	Al	Qaeda’s	political	justifications	more	broadly	–	in	regard	to	the	Western	
military	interventionism	and	neo-colonialism	which	drives	their	militant	response.	
	
Let	me	begin	by	just	conceding	the	point.	I	fully	agree	that	my	text	does	reproduce	
the	discursive	silence	that	Heath-Kelly	discerns	here.	I	am	grateful	to	her	for	pointing	this	
out,	but	also	for	graciously	allowing	the	qualifying	“unintentional”	into	her	observation	of	
this	reproduction,	for	I	also	need	to	concede	that	there	is	nothing	in	my	text	that	expressly	
warrants	this	gracious	qualification.	I	nevertheless	wish	to	confirm	that	my	reproduction	of	
this	discursive	silence	was	indeed	unintentional.	And	perhaps	Heath-Kelly	will	also	
graciously	allow	me	to	cut	myself	a	little	more	slack	here	by	adding	the	qualification	
“inevitable,”	considering	that	the	link	between	Europe’s	economic	fundamentalism	and	its	
states	of	emergency	is	already	quite	a	big	fish	to	fry	for	one	critical	intervention.	Having	said	
this,	however,	let	me	again	stress	that	Heath-Kelly’s	point	is	well	taken,	but	perhaps	only	
with	one	small,	but,	to	my	mind,	significant	exception:	I	struggle	to	come	to	terms	with	the	
contention	that	my	“article	silences	the	voice	of	the	Paris	perpetrators.”	Frankly,	I	sense	no	
need	and	experience	no	wish	to	give	the	Bataclan	perpetrators	themselves	any	kind	of	
voice.	One	simply	stares	too	directly	into	a	mind-numbing	failure	of	basic	humanity	here	to	
want	to	give	a	hearing	to	the	voice	of	the	perpetrators	themselves	(in	the	same	way	that	I	
do	not	experience	the	remotest	wish	to	give	a	direct	voice	to	anyone	who	issues	or	executes	
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an	order	to	drop	a	bomb	on	civilian	settlements).	For	the	rest,	however,	I	fully	comprehend	
the	need	to	pay	attention	to	the	discursive	silence	Heath-Kelly	points	out	and	to	duly	select	
it	as	a	guiding	principle	of	critical	inquiry,	as	she	does	in	her	response	to	my	NP	intervention.		
Further	to	this,	one	should	also	pursue	further	the	possibility	of	significant	links	
between	Europe’s	economic	fundamentalism	and	its	fundamentalist	military	
interventionism.	There	may	well	be	much	more	at	stake	here	that	warrants	careful	
attention,	but	I	shall	only	point	out	one	line	of	questioning	that	seems	important	to	pursue	
further	in	this	regard,	namely,	the	link	between	–	what	one	might	call	–	a	domestic	
sovereignty	deficit,	on	the	one	hand,	and	foreign	sovereignty	excesses,	on	the	other.	One	
should,	for	instance,	question	in	this	regard	all	the	reasons	for	France’s	commencement	of	
airstrikes	in	Syria	in	September	2015	and	pay	specific	attention	to	the	question	whether	
Hollande’s	decision	to	act	forcefully	abroad	was	not	at	least	partly	motivated	by	an	attempt	
to	compensate	for	the	pervasive	perception	of	the	domestic	political	paralysis	into	which	his	
government	descended	in	the	wake	of	his	failure	to	make	good	on	his	electoral	promise	to	
renegotiate	the	debilitating	austerity	measures	of	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact.	
This	is	of	course	only	a	line	of	questioning	and	not	of	contention,	and	it	is	doubtful	
whether	it	will	produce	enough	evidence	soon	enough	to	support	a	firm	contestation	in	the	
near	future.	It	nevertheless	remains	a	question	that	critical	inquiry	must	keep	open	and	
alive	(Ramani,	2015),20	considering	the	frequency	with	which	the	fundamentalisms	–	the	
human	rights	and	liberty	fundamentalisms!	–	that	informed	Western	military	
interventionism	in	the	past,	came	across	as	all	too	mixed	up	with	cynical	compensatory	
and/or	distraction	strategies.	
	
Guittet,	Agamben’s	Pessimism	and	the	Time	of	Hermeneutics		
Emmanuel-Pierre	Guittet’s	response	to	my	NP	intervention	offers	a	poignant	and	perceptive	
description	of	the	“risk-soaked	security	imaginary”	with	which	contemporary	modes	of	
political	sovereignty	present	themselves	as	an	inevitable	system	of	“precautionary	
governmental	processes”	for	which	no	alternative	exists.	He	describes	the	sheer	
anthropological	pessimism	that	informs	this	reduction	of	politics	to	precaution	and	risk-
																																																						
20	Samuel	Ramani	(2015),	to	whom	Heath-Kelly	refers,	is	surely	also	doing	this.	He	observes	the	following:	“As	
President	Francois	Hollande	remains	deeply	unpopular,	an	aggressive	foreign	policy	towards	Syria	could	rally	
nationalist	 sentiment	 and	 underscore	 Hollande’s	 leadership	 credentials	 ahead	 of	 the	 2017	 presidential	
elections.”	
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management	accurately	and	forcefully,	and	I	can	fully	endorse	from	my	side	the	resonances	
that	he	discerns	between	his	critical	engagement	with	this	securitisation	of	politics	and	the	
technocratic	reduction	of	politics	that	I	describe	as	a	process	of	dehermeneutisation.21	
However,	Guittet	also	cautions	against	any	critical	engagement	with	this	securitisation	of	
the	political	that	corroborates	its	underlying	pessimism,	instead	of	challenging	it,	and	finds	
signs	of	this	corroboration	in	my	reliance	on	Agamben’s	work.	Guittet	writes:		
Nonetheless,	encapsulating	these	issues	in	an	anxious	reading	of	politics	under	the	
authority	of	Agamben’s	Homo	Sacer	series	of	work	as	Van	der	Walt	does	in	his	piece	
(2016),	where	political	hope	is	hopeless,	and	inscribing	them	in	a	pessimistic	and	
impoverished	understanding	of	societal	practice,	is	itself	dangerous	(Guittet,	2008).	
Politics	is	a	doomed	enterprise	from	the	start.	It	is	a	blessing	and	a	curse	at	the	same	
time	(Agamben,	1990).	Strangely	enough,	Van	der	Walt’s	previous	article	(2015)	is	
less	guided	by	the	gloomy	picture	of	the	present	state	of	things	one	can	find	in	
Agamben,	and	perhaps	more	attuned	to	the	Italian	thinker’s	classicism	as	his	work	
fraught	with	riddles	for	his	Latinist	and	medievalist	peers.				
	
I	will	not	address	here	the	question	whether	Agamben’s	Homo	Sacer	series	of	work	is	
indeed	informed	by	“a	pessimistic	and	impoverished	understanding	of	societal	practice.”	
That	will	take	us	too	far	away	from	the	question	that	is	more	immediately	at	stake	here,	
namely,	whether	my	reliance	on	Agamben’s	work	reproduces	the	“pessimistic	and	
impoverished	understanding	of	societal	practice”	that	Guittet	attributes	to	his	“Homo	Sacer	
series	of	work.”		I	would	like	to	address	this	question	by	commencing	with	this	observation:	
Even	if	one	were	to	conclude	that	the	Homo	Sacer	series	of	work	is	“inscrib[ed]	…	in	a	
pessimistic	and	impoverished	understanding	of	societal	practice,”	it	would	still	be	very	
possible	to	find	in	this	series	of	work	significant	insights	that	may	help	one	to	transcend	
whatever	pessimism	or	impoverished	understanding	may	be	at	work	here.	It	should	be	
noted	that	not	only	my	“Literary	Exception”	contribution	to	New	Perspectives	(van	der	Walt,	
2015),	but	also	my	ODH	intervention	turns	much	more	on	a	reading	of	Agamben’s	later	
work	The	Time	That	Remains.	However,	in	both	cases	I	find	the	key	for	my	reading	of	The	
Time	That	Remains	in	an	important	passage	from	Homo	Sacer	on	the	Aristotelian	distinction	
between	actuality	and	potentiality.	It	is	on	the	basis	of	this	passage	that	I	discern	a	further	
development	of	Agamben’s	thought	in	Homo	Sacer,	or	even	a	response	to	it,	in	The	Time	
That	Remains.	And	it	is	this	further	development	or	response	that	becomes	central	to	my	
arguments	in	both	the	“Literary	Exception”	article	and	my	ODH	intervention.	
																																																						
21	See	again	footnote	2	above.		
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Now,	this	reliance	on	The	Time	That	Remains	may	not	get	me	off	the	hook	as	regards	
the	“pessimistic	and	impoverished	understanding	of	societal	practice”	that	bothers	Guittet	
for	he	seems	to	attribute	pessimism	also	to	the	“optimistic”	reading	of	Agamben’s	later	
work	by	Sergei	Prozorov.	Guittet	writes:	
While	retrieving	the	questions	of	potentiality,	redemption	and	salvation,	Prozorov	
re-assigns	Agamben	to	a	rather	pessimistic	understanding	of	time	–	a	Judeo-
Christian	understanding	of	linear	time,	one	could	say	–	where	hopes,	but	mostly	
fears,	are	associated	with	predictions	of	the	end	of	the	world:	the	worse	things	get,	
the	better	the	potential	results.	
	
I	cannot	engage	with	Prozorov’s	reading	of	Agamben	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	my	
reading	of	The	Time	That	Remains	pivots	on	a	key	thought	that	can	be	extracted	from	St.	
Paul’s	hos	me	instruction	to	the	early	Christian	communities.	At	issue	in	this	thought	is	not	a	
concern	with	the	end	of	the	world,	but	an	indefinite	postponement	of	this	concern	which	
largely	renders	it	irrelevant	as	far	as	terrestrial	political	engagement	is	concerned.	It	is	the	
indefinite	postponement	of	the	end	of	time	that	allows	for	“the	time	that	remains,”	that	is,	
the	time	with	which	we	can	and	must	concern	ourselves	without	invoking	the	perfect	justice	
that	is	the	exclusive	prerogative	of	God’s	final	reckoning	at	the	end	of	time.	It	is	this	Pauline	
postponement	of	God’s	justice	that	allows	for	time	to	go	on,	for	time	to	remain,	and	thus	for	
a	time	in	which	mortal	beings	can	engage	in	a	modest	secular	politics	that	befits	their	partial	
and	limited	wisdom.	This	is	the	time	of	hermeneutics,	for	hermeneutics	will	only	end	when	
God’s	final	message	leaves	his	finger	or	forehead	with	a	digital	perfection	and	immediacy	
that	will	neither	require	nor	tolerate	any	interpretation	or	translation;	similarly	biblical	
hermeneutics	also	only	gained	importance	when	Jesus	had	been	away	long	enough	to	
warrant	the	assumption	that	he	would	not	be	returning	all	that	soon.22	
The	contemplation	of	a	time	that	will	be	allowed	to	remain	and	endure	as	long	as	no	
gnostically-deluded	mortal	engages	too	apocalyptically	with	disastrous	conceptions	of	
perfect	justice	and	holy	truth,	evidently	warrants	little	reason	for	much	optimism.	However,	
it	does	allow	for	a	creative	politics	that	refuses	to	give	up	on	the	idea	of	futures	that	can	be	
significantly	different	from	the	present,	while	also	refusing	to	entertain	the	idea	that	any	
one	of	these	futures	will	come	to	realise	the	good	society	for	good.	These	two	parameters,	
																																																						
22	This	is	a	somewhat	free	inference	from	the	fact	that	hermeneutics	played	no	significant	role	in	the	early	
Christian	communities,	given	their	concern	with	a	direct	(extra-textual)	experience	of	Jesus	(see	Sherrat,	2006:	
42).		
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taken	from	Marcel	Gauchet	(2002:	9-14),23	demarcate	the	space	and	opportunity	for	a	
politics	in	which	human	intelligence,	courage	and	resourcefulness	may	still	play	enough	of	a	
role	to	endow	future	existence	on	earth	with	adequate	levels	of	dignity.	
	
Dos	Reis	and	the	Technocratic	Transformation	of	the	Exception	into	a	Zone	of	
Extra-Legal	Expertise		
Fear	that	the	avoidance	of	apocalypse	may	well	still	translate	into	an	infinite	eschaton	that	
renders	the	absence	of	the	good	society	all	too	clear,	while	erasing	all	hope	for	different	
futures	(that	may,	at	least	from	time	to	time,	change	the	décor	of	desperation),	is	
nevertheless	hardly	surprising	in	the	times	we	live.	This	fear	is	evidently	already	speaking	its	
mind	on	the	last	pages	of	my	ODH	intervention,	but	it	really	begins	to	haunt	the	heart	when	
one	reads	Filipe	dos	Reis’	sophisticated	account	of	the	ways	in	which	contemporary	modes	
of	governance	close	down	hermeneutic	space	by	erasing	the	difference	between	states	of	
exception	and	regular	rule	of	law.	Dos	Reis’	description	of	this	process	is	indeed	nothing	less	
than	an	exacting	account	of	how	the	avoidance	of	apocalypse	translates	into	an	eschaton	in	
a	time	of	technocratic	juridification.	
Dos	Reis’	analysis	of	this	process	of	technocratic	juridification	takes	its	cue	from	
Fleur	Johns’	conception	of	a	non-legality	that	does	not	constitute	an	illegality,	but	a	certain	
extra-legality.	Dos	Reis	writes:	
For	Johns,	states	of	exception	do	not	create	spaces	of	illegality,	but	rather	of	“extra-
legality”.	Extra-legality	is	not	“necessarily	identified	with	the	transgression	of	law”	as	
it	rather	gives	“shape	to	a	domain,	situation	or	set	of	forces	outside	the	law,	whether	
temporarily	or	permanently.	Extra-legal	domains	are,	nonetheless,	jurisdictions.	That	
is,	they	are	spaces	from	which	the	authority	of	the	law	gets	spoken	or	performed.”	
	
It	is	well-known	that	the	concept	of	the	state	of	exception	has	been	contemplated	
before	in	terms	of	a	complex	of	continuity	and	discontinuity	between	the	legal	and	the	
extra-legal	or	the	constituent	and	the	constituted	power.	The	Schmitt-Kelsen	debate	is	a	
standard	point	of	reference	in	this	regard,	from	the	perspective	of	which	Schmitt	is	mostly	
associated	with	the	concern	with	an	(at	least	partly)	extra-legal	constituent	power,	while	
Kelsen	is	mostly	considered	the	champion	of	a	completely	intra-legal	constituted	power.	
																																																						
23	I	am	indebted	to	a	recent	academic	exchange	with	Panu	Minkinnen,	Emilios	Christodoulidis	and	Chris	Doude	
van	Troostwijk	for	bringing	this	important	book	to	my	attention.	
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The	picture	is	much	more	complex	than	this	elementary	delineation	suggests.24	Suffice	it	
nevertheless	to	just	observe	here	the	key	concern	of	theorists	whose	scholarly	endeavours	
remain	inspired	by	the	possibility	of	an	extra-legal	constituent	power.	For	them,	the	concern	
with	constituent	power	is	a	concern	with	a	future	that	is	not	entirely	pre-determined	by	the	
past.	In	other	words,	the	scholarly	concern	with	constituent	power	entails	an	intellectual	
resistance	to	an	end	of	time	that	promises	no	significant	future.	
Whether	this	resistance	to	eschaton	and	eschatology	requires	a	simple	endorsement	
of	Schmitt’s	and	a	dismissal	of	Kelsen’s	thinking	is	doubtful.	Suffice	it	nevertheless	to	
observe	that	the	adamant	insistence	that	constituent	power	should	not	be	reduced	to	
constituted	power	contemplates	a	rupture	between	law	and	politics	–	and	between	the	
legal	and	the	extra-legal	–	that	not	only	demands,	but	also	conditions	the	possibility	of	a	
creative	hermeneutic	intervention	without	which	the	chance	of	significantly	different	
futures	is	no	longer	thinkable.	It	is	this	possibility	of	a	truly	constituent	political	rupture	that	
the	technocratic	juridification	of	politics	seeks	to	close	down	completely	in	our	time.	Dos	
Reis	describes	this	juridification	with	reference	to	collaborations	between	security	and	legal	
experts	(and	human	rights	experts	to	boot!)	that	aim	to	design	a	security	law	that	not	only	
governs	future	cases,	but	also	its	own	future	development.	Here	is	one	of	the	key	
descriptions	that	he	offers	of	this	process:	
Here,	a	depoliticising	effect	runs	in	two	directions.	First,	although	there	has	been	
significant	human	rights	advocacy	in	the	context	of	counter-terrorist	measures	(e.g.	
with	regard	to	detention	and	practices	of	‘terror	lists’),	struggles	over	the	
‘rightfulness’	of	these	measures	were	often	carried	on	outside	the	realm	of	a	
broader	public	and	within	highly	complex	legal	vocabularies	between	legal	experts	
working	for	human	rights	advocacy,	on	the	one	hand,	and	those	working	for	national	
security	agencies	on	the	other.	Second,	the	latter	group	of	experts	attempts	to	
transform	discussions	about	rights	and	the	punishment	of	past	terrorist	acts	into	a	
discussion	about	pre-emptive	counter-terrorist	measures.	In	this	regard,	they	appear	
to	be	trying	to	give	the	fight	against	terrorism	a	‘carte	blanche’	to	establish	various	
exceptional	measures.	This	signifies	not	only	a	shift	in	the	temporality	of	law,	i.e.	
towards	a	future-oriented	law,	but	also	institutionalises	a	related	bureaucracy	and	
thus	perpetuates	states	of	emergency	as	it	creates	a	demand	for	technocratic	risk	
expertise.		
	
One	can	hardly	hope	for	a	more	accurate	description	of	how	the	avoidance	of	
apocalypse	turns	into	an	asphyxiating	embrace	of	eschaton	than	the	one	offered	in	this	
																																																						
24	For	more	nuanced	views	of	Kelsen’s	position,	see	Van	Ooyen	(2008:	XIX),	Chiassoni	(2013:	137),	and	Navarro	
(2013:	88).	
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passage.	Dos	Reis	commends	my	NP	intervention	for	contributing	to	the	understanding	of	
this	process.	The	resonance	between	what	he	has	in	mind	and	what	I	was	getting	at	in	my	
intervention	is	evident,	but	it	is	really	I	who	must	thank	him	for	offering	a	more	precise	
vocabulary	–	which	I	certainly	did	not	command	at	the	time	of	articulating	the	NP	
intervention	–	and	for	thinking	through	some	of	the	most	disconcerting	issues	that	are	at	
stake	here.		
	
Kamis,	Epistemology	and	the	Personal	
Ben	Kamis	begins	his	response	to	my	NP	intervention	with	a	description	of	the	many	ways	in	
which	his	and	my	research	interests	and	focuses	overlap	and	I	certainly	also	notice	this	
common	ground	from	my	side.	I	nevertheless	wish	to	highlight	one	passage	of	his	response	
that	situates	my	ODH	intervention	in	a	framework	of	thinking	in	which	it	does	not	fit	as	
comfortably	as	he	thinks.	Kamis	writes:	
The	argument	progresses	through	all	the	waypoints	one	would	expect:	Agamben,	
Calvin	(via	Weber),	Gadamer.	And	the	basic	intuition	that	the	state	is	better	
understood	as	the	thuggish	enforcer	of	the	market	rather	than	an	arena	of	complex	
interests	and	subjective	motivations	that	are	negotiated	in	more	or	less	democratic	
or	bureaucratic	procedures	strongly	recalls	an	established	tradition	in	leftist	political	
economy	that	runs	from	Lenin	to	Jessop.	In	short,	those	unfamiliar	with	such	
critiques	of	state-market	linkages	and	Europe’s	engagement	with	Islam	will	learn	
much.	Those	of	us	in	the	choir,	however,	have	heard	this	sermon	before.	
	
The	last	line	of	this	passage	can	perhaps	be	considered	the	most	stinging	in	an	
otherwise	very	friendly	response.	I	can	only	say	that	I	certainly	endeavoured	to	do	a	little	
better	than	repeating	a	well-known	sermon,	but	accept	that	many	readers	might	not	be	
convinced	in	this	regard.	I	accordingly	also	accept	that	Kamis	may	have	well-considered	
reasons	for	counting	himself	among	them.	I	am	therefore	especially	grateful	to	him	for	
valiantly	moving	on	to	identify	my	personal	touch	to	the	sermon	as	at	least	one	reason	for	
taking	notice	of	it.	In	what	follows,	I	shall	rely	on	his	generous	effort	in	this	regard	for	
purposes	of	briefly	putting	forward	again	a	line	of	thinking	that	I	have	developed	in	a	
number	of	previous	articles,	including	“The	Literary	Exception”.	I	wish	to	do	so	for	purposes	
of	taking	the	responses	that	I	have	developed	above	–	especially	those	to	Dos	Reis	and	
Guittet	–	one	step	further.	Before	I	do	so,	however,	I	would	also	like	to	point	out	that	I	do	
not	quite	share	the	basic	intuition	“that	the	state	is	better	understood	as	the	thuggish	
enforcer	of	the	market	rather	than	an	arena	of	complex	interests	and	subjective	
motivations,”	etc.	that	may	be	attributable	to	a	long	line	of	leftist	thinking.	I	certainly	
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welcome	being	associated	with	leftist	thinking,	but	would	prefer	to	be	associated	with	an	
equally	long	line	of	leftist	thinking	that	attaches	much	importance	to	the	emancipatory	
potential	of	the	modern	state	in	an	age	–	our	age	–	of	rampant	civil	society	abductions	of	
public	interest.	
Let	me	nevertheless	return	now	to	Kamis’	generous	engagement	with	the	personal	
touch	that,	at	least	according	to	him,	saves	my	ODH	intervention	from	redundancy.	I	discern	
in	this	endeavour	a	thought	that	I	consider	profound	-	much	too	profound,	in	fact,	to	be	
bestowed	on	the	personal	reflections	on	the	freshly	declared	state	of	emergency	in	France	
on	the	morning	of	14	November	that	I	slipped	into	the	opening	paragraphs	of	my	ODH	
intervention.	Kamis	invokes	in	this	regard	the	curious	tension	between	the	meta-theoretical	
or	methodological	recognition	of	personal	experience	as	a	“common	source	of	inspiration	
[of]	great	work,”	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	refusal	–	especially	evident	in	Germany	today	–	
to	allow	such	personal	experiences	into	scholarly	dissertations	and	writing.	In	other	words,	
the	mixed	message	of	current	social	scientific	methodology	is	this:	By	all	means	rely	on	
personal	experiences	–	it	often	leads	to	great	work,	but	“[just]	don’t	talk	about	that	sort	of	
thing	in	your	writing.”	The	reasons	for	this	methodological	exclusion	of	personal	experience	
from	scholarly	writing	are	threefold:	1)	no	one	cares	about	what	we	think,	as	the	scholarly	
community	is	only	interested	in	what	we	can	demonstrate;	2)	passionate	or	personal	
engagement	with	one’s	subject	matter	interferes	with	scholarly	analysis;	and	3)	reflections	
of	personal	experiences	in	scholarship	are	ploys	to	deflect	criticism,	considering	that	they	
render	all	criticism	personal	or	ad	hominem.		
I	am	not	all	that	sure	that	my	ODH	intervention	defies	these	potential	points	of	
criticism,	as	Kamis	generously	suggests.	Many	readers	may	indeed	feel	that	I	exposed	the	
intervention	to	exactly	these	points	of	criticism	by	inserting	my	personal	reflections	on	14	
November	into	the	opening	paragraph	in	the	way	I	did.	A	throwaway	statement	in	D&K’s	
reaction	to	my	intervention	–	“Clearly,	the	recent	terrorist	attacks	in	France	and	Belgium	
made	a	strong	impression	upon	his	research	endeavours”	–	may	well	have	a	touch	of	this	
criticism	in	it.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	really	interesting	point	that	Kamis	raises	here	concerns	
the	contradiction	or	paradox	that	informs	the	kind	of	academic	critique	he	outlines	in	the	
passage	above.	On	the	one	hand,	the	critique	reflects	an	awareness	that	a	personal	
experience	or	inclination	may	well	constitute	an	important	impetus	for	social	scientific	
research.	On	the	other	hand,	it	insists	that	such	an	experience	or	inclinations	should	not	be	
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articulated	as	part	of	the	research	undertaken,	given	that	such	an	articulation	exposes	the	
researcher	to	one	or	more	of	the	three	lines	of	criticism	that	Kamis	points	out:	a	lack	of	
objectivity,	weak	analysis,	and	obstruction	of	due	criticism.	
Now,	I	largely	actually	endorse	the	social	scientific	demand	that	personal	
considerations	and	experience	should	not	become	too	conspicuously	or	prominently	part	of	
social	scientific	predication,	for	all	three	of	the	reasons	Kamis	points	out,	and	perhaps	even	
for	some	others.	However,	the	paradox	that	Kamis	highlights	remains	intriguing.	Why	is	it	so	
that	social	scientific	research	must	return	to	the	dimension	of	personal	experience	for	
inspiration	only	to	take	leave	of	it	as	quickly	as	possible?	It	would	appear	that	social	
scientific	research	has	two	intrinsic	directions	or	trajectories:	a	harking	back	to	the	personal,	
on	the	one	hand,	and	a	taking	leave	of	it,	on	the	other.	Its	self-understanding	is	further	
largely	informed	by	the	insistence	that	one	trajectory	should	erase	or	suppress	the	other	
trajectory,	notwithstanding	its	irreducible	dependence	on	it	and	the	concomitant	need	to	
revisit	it	without	acknowledging	it.	But	again,	why	is	this	so?	Why	is	the	personal	so	
indispensable	for	and	yet	so	intolerable	to	social	scientific	inquiry?	
One	way	to	make	sense	of	this	paradox	of	two	opposing	trajectories,	of	which	one	
must	be	suppressed	for	the	sake	of	the	other,	but	nevertheless	not	entirely	eliminated	for	
reasons	of	also	depending	on	that	which	must	be	suppressed,	is	to	cast	the	paradox	in	terms	
of	the	relation	between	disorder,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	creation	of	order,	on	the	other.	
Casting	the	problematic	at	stake	here	in	these	terms	allows	one	to	relate	the	problematic	
relation	between	social	science	and	the	personal	directly	to	the	ordoliberal	concern	with	
creating	an	order	of	liberty.	The	aim	of	the	discussion	that	follows	now	is	indeed	to	lead	this	
engagement	with	Kamis	back	to	my	suspicion	–	voiced	at	the	beginning	of	my	response	to	
D&K	–	that	an	exclusive	concern	with	establishing	an	order	of	liberty	is	bound	to	turn	out	to	
be	an	authoritarian	and	illiberal	concern	with	order.	
	
Ordoliberalism,	Liberal	Democracy	and	Authoritarian	Liberalism		
Creating	order	is	simply	not	possible	at	all	unless	there	is	some	disorder	that	can	be	put	into	
order.	Creating	order	is,	nevertheless,	by	its	very	design	and	purpose,	an	endeavour	to	
retreat	from	disorder.	Endeavours	to	establish	order	are,	for	this	reason,	never	likely	to	
linger	too	long	with	the	disorder	from	which	the	order	seeks	to	distance	itself.	An	element	
of	suppression	thus	seems	inevitable	here.	Not	only	must	disorder	be	subjected	to	designs	
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of	order,	but	it	must	also	be	largely	suppressed	by	these	designs	if	they	are	to	be	effective,	
or	so	it	seems.	Perhaps	this	indeed	explains	the	paradoxical	relation	between	social	science	
and	personality	well,	considering	that	social	science	may	be	deemed	a	way	of	ordering	
personal	life,	as	Michel	Foucault’s	reflections	on	social	science	suggest	(Foucault,	1984:	3-4,	
83-85).	
However,	the	inclination	to	suppress	disorder,	in	addition	to	subjecting	it	to	designs	
of	order,	only	makes	sense	from	the	perspective	of	a	normative	privileging	of	order	over	
disorder.	Only	when	one	considers	order	intrinsically	good	and	disorder	intrinsically	bad	
does	it	become	imperative	not	only	to	subject	disorder	to	order,	but	also	to	suppress	and	
eradicate	disorder	as	far	as	feasible.	In	the	absence	of	such	normative	privileging,	it	would	
be	quite	possible	to	consider	order	and	disorder	as	mutually	co-constitutive.	From	the	
perspective	of	such	mutual	co-constitutionality,	any	practical	need	to	subject	disorder	to	
order	would	not	have	to	be	accompanied	by	a	supplementary	endeavour	to	suppress	and	
deny	disorder.	One	may,	for	good	reasons,	want	to	tidy	up	a	toddler’s	room	from	time	to	
time,	even	as	frequently	as	possible,	but	one	need	not	deprive	the	child	of	the	spontaneity	
and	liberty	to	make	a	good	mess	of	things	again,	unless	one	considers	this	mess	intrinsically	
abominable.	
When	one	foregoes	the	normative	privileging	of	order	over	disorder,	one	may	well	
arrive	at	an	understanding	of	societal	organisation	that	is	quite	similar	to	managing	but	not	
suppressing	the	eternal	potential	for	chaos	in	a	toddler’s	room.	It	is	this	approach	to	the	
organisation	of	social	space	that	informs	a	series	of	arguments	regarding	the	relation	
between	law	and	literature	that	I	put	forward	in	“The	Literary	Exception”	and	a	number	of	
other	recent	publications.		The	arguments	developed	in	these	publications	pivot	on	a	
construction	of	the	relation	between	law	and	poetry	in	terms	of	two	opposite	trajectories	of	
language,	with	law	being	the	trajectory	of	language	that	seeks	to	distance	itself	from	the	
chaos	that	ensues	from	a	disruptive	event,	and	poetry	being	the	trajectory	of	language	that	
harks	back	to	a	disruptive	event	and	even	solicits	it,	notwithstanding	–	and	perhaps	for	the	
sake	of	–	the	chaos	that	erupts	with	it.	Law	and	poetry	may	thus	be	considered	linguistic	
fora	for	society’s	respective	needs	for	both	order	and	disorder.	In	another	recent	piece,	I	
offered	this	graphic	depiction	of	this	inverse	relation	between	law	and	poetry	that	depicts	
the	inverse	parallel	relation	between	them	–	the	more	legal	the	language,	the	less	poetic	it	
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is	–	in	terms	of	the	two	triangles	that	result	from	a	diagonal	division	of	a	rectangular	
spectrum	(van	der	Walt,	2016:	134).		
	
The	diagnosis	of	religious	radicalisation	offered	in	“The	Literary	Exception”	concerns	
the	suggestion	that	the	excessive	focus	on	legal	and	economic	integration	at	the	expense	of	
other	modes	of	societal	integration	in	the	EU,	deprives	especially	young	people	in	Europe	of	
poetic	relief	from	dominant	patterns	of	social	order;	hence	the	recourse	to	bizarre	forms	of	
religious	radicalisation	not	only	among	economically	disadvantaged,	but	also	among	
relatively	affluent	individuals.	One	need	not	go	into	the	merits	of	this	argument	here,	but	it	
warrants	mentioning	in	passing	that	it	surely	defies	any	allegation	that	my	OHD	intervention	
entertains	a	“mono-causal”	understanding	of	religious	radicalisation	that	attributes	it	
exclusively	to	socio-economic	deprivation.25	
Be	it	as	it	may,	the	existential	yearning	for	a	relief	from	the	established	social	order	
may	be	argued	to	find	its	purest	or	most	sublime	expression	in	poetic	–	and	indeed	highly	
‘personal’	–	challenges	to	established	patterns	of	linguistic	meaning,	but	poetry,	in	the	strict	
sense	of	the	word,	is	surely	not	its	only	expression.	Well-functioning	liberal	democratic	
institutions	–	under	the	auspices	of	which	democracy	is	truly	free	–	allow	for	political	
transition	procedures	and	crisis	resolution	practices	that	tolerate	considerable	challenges	to	
existing	orders.	Of	concern,	here,	are	not	only	relatively	open	election	procedures	that	allow	
for	considerable	challenges	to	established	social	orders	(challenges	that	early	modern	
democracies	still	tried	to	suppress	by	linking	the	right	to	vote	to	ownership	of	property),	but	
also	allowances	for	other	disruptive	social	practices	such	as	the	right	to	strike.	Alain	Supiot	
evidently	contemplates	precisely	such	an	understanding	of	the	right	to	strike	when	he	
writes	about	the	pathological	mutation	of	democratic	energies	that	predictably	results	from	
																																																						
25	See	endnote	2	above.		
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the	suppression	of	collective	action	and	the	right	to	strike	(Supiot,	2010:	73).	Strike	action	is	
not	just	an	instrument	in	the	pursuit	of	workers’	interests,	Supiot	suggests,	but	it	is	also	a	
form	of	energetic	democratic	expression	that	is	likely	to	seek	more	destructive	forms	of	
release	if	it	were	to	be	suppressed	and	banished	from	social	life.		
At	stake	here	is	a	recognition	of	the	poetic	inclination	that	informs	a	truly	liberal	
democratic	spirit.	One	should	recognise	the	living	poetry	that	erupts	when	committed	
collective	action	bursts	into	song	and	the	existential	ritual	of	rhythmic	refusal.	Allowance	for	
this	living	poetry	–	and	for	personal	grief	and	frustration	to	thus	become	a	significant	public	
concern	–	is	ultimately	what	distinguishes	liberal	democracy	from	authoritarian	
institutionalisations	of	liberty.	It	is	from	the	perspective	of	this	distinction	that	I	now	wish	to	
conclude	all	my	observations	here	with	a	reference	to	the	ordoliberal	concern	with	order	
with	which	my	response	to	D&K	commenced	above.		
The	poetic	liberal	democratic	spirit	invoked	here,	and	the	concomitant	tolerance	of	a	
primordial	resistance	to	order	as	a	constitutive	element	of	order,	are	largely	absent	from	the	
social	landscape	of	the	EU	today.	The	suppression	of	the	right	to	strike	by	the	Court	of	
Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU)	in	two	epochal	judgments	in	2007	may	for	this	reason	
be	considered	a	symbolic	expression	of	the	EU’s	excessive	or	predominant	concern	with	an	
economic	order	of	undistorted	competition	as	the	sole	or	predominant	mode	of	European	
integration.26	There	are	many	social	and	legal	theorists	that	consider	this	EU	landscape	a	
victory	of	ordoliberal	thinking.	Several	of	them	also	point	out	an	old	proximity	between	the	
ordoliberal	thinkers	of	Weimar	and	the	conservative	revolution	afoot	at	the	time,	noting	
especially	Hermann	Heller’s	observation	regarding	the	“authoritarian	liberalism”	of	some	of	
his	contemporaries	(Manow,	2001;	Wilkinson,	2015).	
Should	today’s	ordoliberals	wish	to	dismiss	this	old	link	as	a	myth,	or	should	they	at	
least	wish	to	sever	it	today,	or	show	that	they	have	already	severed	it	in	recent	
years/decades,	they	would	appear	to	have	quite	a	bit	of	persuading	to	do,	considering	the	
considerable	number	of	scholars	out	there	who	evidently	do	not	share	the	“deep	
																																																						
26		The	two	CJEU	rulings	(earlier	referred	to	as	ECJ	rulings)	at	stake	here	are	Laval	and	Viking.	See	EU	Case	C-
341/05	[2007]	(Laval)	and	EU	Case	C-438/05	[2007]	(Viking).	In	both	these	judgments,	the	CJEU	recognised	the	
right	to	strike,	but	subordinated	it	to	the	freedom	of	movement	of	goods	and	services	in	the	EU.	For	a	more	
extensive	 discussion	 of	 these	 cases,	 see	 Van	 der	Walt	 (2014:	 334-360).	 For	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 political	
economy	of	market	integration	in	the	EU	and	a	critique	of	the	CJEU’s	(or	the	ECJ’s)	role	in	this	one-sided	push	
for	market	integration,	see	Fritz	Scharpf	(2009;	2010).	
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understanding”	of	ordoliberal	thinking	that	allegedly	goes	around	in	Freiburg.	What	a	
refreshing	and	liberating	disorder	would	not	ensue	in	scholarly	circles	if	dyed	in	the	wool	
ordoliberals	came	out	to	wrong-foot	so	many	of	us	by	denouncing	austerity,	Germany’s	
treatment	of	Greece,	and	the	CJEU’s	subordination	of	the	right	to	strike	to	the	free	
movement	of	goods	and	services;	if,	in	other	words,	they	came	out	to	show	us	the	way	to	a	
different	Europe,	a	creative	and	poetic	Europe	that	can	embrace	disorder	as	part	and	parcel	
of	vibrant	liberal	democracies;	a	Europe	that	has	an	adequate	regard	for	the	ways	in	which	
established	order	brutally	disqualifies	so	many	from	participating	in	“undistorted”	
competition;	a	Europe	that	can	put	two	and	two	together	to	arrive	at	the	simple	realisation	
that	this	disqualification	has	always	been	the	major	source	of	distorted	competition	both	in	
Europe	and	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	Just	a	couple	of	prominent	articles	by	the	Vanbergs	of	
this	world	(or	of	Freiburg)	would	surely	do	the	trick.	Until	such	a	time	as	this	comes	to	pass,	
however,	many	of	us	would	have	to	be	forgiven	for	searching	for	links	between	the	
increasingly	authoritarian	signature	of	contemporary	Europe’s	market	order	and	the	
authoritarian	liberalism	of	old	Europe.	And	those	of	us	who	do	so	will	also	have	to	be	
forgiven	for	beginning	this	search	with	contemporary	schools	of	economic	thinking	that	still	
march	unflinchingly	under	the	banner	of	Weimar	ordoliberalism,	especially	when	this	
confident	march	begins	to	show	signs	of	a	disconcerting	irresponsibility.	
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